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ABSTRACT 
As the United States Air Force air base defense doctrine evolved over the years, 
implementation and execution errors were occasionally exploited by insurgent forces 
operating in the areas adjacent to U.S. occupied air bases.  Executing unconventional 
attack methodologies, primarily via stand-off weapons, these insurgents were able to 
wreak havoc on U.S. and allied air bases, causing massive destruction and the loss of 
American lives. 
An examination of the literature from air base (ground) attacks in Korea, Vietnam 
and at Khobar Towers indicated several problematic areas resonating in all three cases.  
These common areas include: inadequate intelligence (both organic and external), lack of 
proper focus on critical infrastructure and insufficient or absent force protection 
technologies.   
Many of today’s security experts are predicting future attacks on military 
infrastructure to include stateside and forward-deployed air bases.  Today’s slightly 
diverse, yet consistent insurgent enemy, with attack methodologies mirroring those of 
Korea, Vietnam and Khobar Towers, remains a constant and formidable threat.   
As the Air Force moves forward with its newly implemented Integrated Base 
Defense doctrine, specific attention must be paid to improving upon the problem areas 
from the past.  This thesis focuses on the specific problematic areas, and provides policy 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM  
During the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, U.S. Air Force (USAF) security forces 
were woefully unprepared for the guerrilla-style attacks upon their air bases.1  Insurgent 
forces successfully deployed stand-off weapons (mortars and shoulder-fired rockets) and 
small explosives in an attempt to drive U.S. forces from their territories.  Many of these 
attacks were successful, resulting in the loss of human lives and military war fighting 
assets.  The Cold War changed the face of our enemy, and Air Force security members 
stood post on air bases around the world waiting for saboteurs, infiltrators and small, 
tactical units to penetrate their defenses in an effort to destroy and/or obtain our nuclear 
weapons.  Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we have witnessed fewer state-sponsored acts 
of aggression and sabotage and more transnational, insurgent types of attacks.  With the 
future threat of attacks on air bases once again resembling more of an asymmetric form, 
the Air Force is attempting to counter this reemerging threat by adopting a variation on 
an old theme; morphing its air base ground defense into an Integrated Base Defense 
doctrine.2 
 This study will examine the development and implementation of earlier air base 
defense doctrine during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts as well as the more recent 
attack on Khobar Towers.  This study will focus on insurgent/guerrilla attacks upon air 
bases in these specific areas and defended primarily by Air Force security personnel.  It 
will also examine how and why these insurgent and unconventional attacks were 
successful against air bases/Air Force assets during these periods and whether air base 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this study, ‘Security Forces’ referred to in this document, describe U.S. Air Force 
security personnel only.  In 1947, upon becoming a separate branch of the armed forces, the Air Force 
maintained the name Military Police (carried over from the Army Air Corps.)  A year later, in an effort to 
establish individual identity, the name was changed to Air Police.  In 1966, the name was changed yet 
again to Security Police.  Finally, in 1997, in an effort to represent all aspects of the inherent mission 
parameters, the name was changed to Security Forces (defenders of the force.)  All terms are 
chronologically applied throughout this work. 
2 Air Force Instruction 31-101, Air Base Defense (15 May 2002), focused primarily on compliance-
based defense standards for Level I (agents, saboteurs) and Level II (small tactical units, guerrillas); while 
Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 3-10.1, Integrated Base Defense (20 August 2004), calls for 
capabilities and effects-based defense against primarily Level I and II threats. 
2 
defense doctrine has developed in an effort to match current enemy methodologies.3  The 
threats facing USAF bases in future contingencies will more than likely resemble those 
encountered in Korea and Vietnam.4  By examining earlier instances of often ineffective 
air base defense doctrine against the asymmetric insurgent threat, this researcher hopes to 
develop recommendations to prevent similar implementation errors against comparable 
enemies and threats faced both today and in the future.  
 Because implementation and understanding of this new Integrated Base Defense 
doctrine (adopted in 2005) is essential, this research will also examine other newly 
implemented and parallel force protection programs that impact Security Forces such as 
critical infrastructure protection and information/intelligence sharing.  Incorporation of 
the Integrated Base Defense doctrine also often calls for enhanced physical security 
technologies to facilitate reduced manning in some critical areas.  Therefore, this research 
will also explore several recent technology-driven force protection programs and other 
advances in technology in relation to air base defense.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH   
With the continuous and unpredictable terrorist and insurgent threat to military 
installations worldwide, coupled with an increased proliferation of high-tech weapons 
and WMD, it is imperative that the tactics, techniques and procedures employed by Air 
Force Security Forces members be maximized to meet this postulated threat.5  
Additionally, with highly unpredictable opponents threatening U.S. aerospace resources 
and assets, force protection programs today require an integrated and cross-functional 
effort on the part of all uniformed members.  Finally, highly-effective understanding and 
implementation of several such newly adopted force protection programs must be 
achieved to prevent a repeat of mistakes made in the past.   
 
                                                  
3 Empirical data will focus on attacks on air bases in Korea, Vietnam and Khobar Towers as there 
have been no attacks on CONUS/OCONUS air bases since the implementation of Integrated Base Defense 
doctrine.  Empirical data, in relation to base attacks will relate only to those bases utilizing air base defense 
doctrine.     
4 Alan Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 1995), 110. 
5 Threats utilizing stand-off weapons and small bombing attacks stand to be increasingly more 
successful based on enhanced technologies and weaponry. 
3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW   
When the U.S. Air Force became a separate branch of the Armed Services in 
1947, it was quickly thrust into a combat environment.  Being called upon to defend its 
own installations and assets during the Korean conflict, with little or no air base ground 
defense capabilities, former Air Force leader Wayne Purser claims they were woefully 
unprepared to execute the air base defense mission.6  Policy makers quickly developed 
ground base defense policy, but fell far short in the creation of Air Force Regulation 355-
4, which stated: “Active local ground defense of Air Force installations by Air Force 
personnel…is an emergency function, normally short in duration, and the capability 
which the Air Force must achieve is an emergency capability.”7  Roger Fox highlighted 
the weak Air Force ground defense by stating: “effective security against sabotage and a 
workable ground defense system was {sic} never fully developed on most Air Force 
installations in Korea” because plans “were not correlated with the threat…or were 
beyond the units’ capability to execute effectively.”  He goes on to say, “the Air Force 
security mission was to protect resources from theft and pilferage, not to defend bases 
from ground attack.”8  Benjamin Hettinga points out that despite the potential for 
damaging attacks against U.S. airfields, North Korean guerrillas, operating clandestinely 
in the area, almost completely ignored these lucrative and often unprepared targets.9  
However, when North Korean guerrillas finally tested coalition air base defense measures 
and clandestine attacks did occur, Air Police units were focused on defending the wrong 
infrastructure and preoccupied with interior security duties.  Hettinga further states that 
after the war, intelligence failures (consistent and numerous inconsistencies between the 
perceived and actual threats), eroded the credibility of air base defense, resulting in 
                                                 
6 LTC Wayne Purser, “Air Base Ground Defense: A Historic Perspective and Vision for the 1990’s” 
(Research Report, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, 1989), 10-11. 
7 United States Air Force, Air Force Regulation 355-4, Defense—Local Ground Defense of Air Force 
Installations (Washington, D.C.: HQ AF, 3 March 1953), 1.  The first official Air Force document on base 
defense. 
8 Roger Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam: 1961-1973 (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
USAF History, 1979), 16. 
9 Benjamin E. Hettinga, “The Defense of Tan Son Nhut Air Base, 31 January 1968: A Study in the 
Nature of Air base Security” (Masters Thesis, Ohio State University, 2001), 12.  Guerrillas attacked 
airfields on two occasions, once at Pohang Airfield, which was successfully evacuated, and at an airstrip 
near Kunsan where guerrilla harassment prevented the opening of a USAF airstrip.  Guerrillas also fired 
small arms at aircraft during take-offs and landings, but no aircraft were damaged or lost.   Hettinga states 
approximately 30,000-35,000 North Korean guerrillas were operating in the UN territory. 
4 
drastic manning reductions and a continued lack of focus on the implementation and 
execution of air base defense doctrine.10  Overall, the air base defense policy during the 
Korean conflict lacked requisite training and initiative, focused point defenses on the 
wrong infrastructure/portions of the air base and lacked adequate functional intelligence 
about the strength of the enemy. 
Operating in an “industrial security model,” defending fixed positions primarily 
within the interior portions of the air bases, USAF Air Police in Vietnam found 
themselves unprepared yet again for what would eventually become an onslaught of 
enemy guerrilla attacks.  Vick’s empirical data (from a RAND study) on air base attacks 
revealed 493 enemy attacks on air bases in Vietnam.11  Fox’s analysis of these attacks 
indicates air base defense policy and doctrine during the Vietnam campaign was 
inadequately developed, training was insufficient, parochialism existed amongst the 
services, host nation forces were unreliable and U.S. forces lacked quality intelligence 
and underestimated the capabilities of the enemy.12  Fox further points out that using 
host-nation Vietnamese forces to protect air bases during the first few years of the war 
led to an “unplanned, uncoordinated and uncontrolled” security relationship between host 
nation and USAF security personnel.13   
U.S. Army and Marine forces, more familiar with infantry tactics and base ground 
defense, were eventually sent to Vietnam to provide additional security near the inner 
perimeter of the air bases.  General William Westmoreland, adamant about using his 
ground forces for offensive maneuvers only, immediately shifted many of these Army 
and Marine forces to the front lines.  Once again, this left USAF personnel (and their yet 
unproven air base defense doctrine) responsible for defending air bases in their entirety.  
David Shlapak points out that while USAF security personnel focused on the interior 
portions of the base, small groups of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) 
guerrillas successfully conducted 96% of their mortar and sapper attacks from just 
                                                 
10 Hettinga, 13. 
11 Vick, 127-153.  75% of these attacks were from stand-off weapons with 60% of the attacks seeking 
to knock out U.S. aircraft.   
12 Fox, 16-17, 27-28. 
13 Ibid., 12. 
5 
outside the perimeter fence.14  Michael Bean’s analysis of air base defense doctrine in 
Vietnam is similar to those of Fox and Vick in that ineffectual policy implementation 
resulted in exterior portions of the air base and other forward areas remaining completely 
unfamiliar to security personnel and ultimately undefended.15  The Air/Security Police’s 
inability to adapt to the enemy’s guerrilla tactics led to frequent and successful enemy 
attacks resulting in the damage and/or destruction of nearly 900 aircraft in Vietnam 
alone.16  
During the latter part of the Cold War, there were fewer failed states and terrorist 
and/or guerrilla attacks on air bases seemed to diminish.17  The most recent attack against 
Air Force assets and personnel where Air Force Security Police provided primary base 
defense took place in 1996 at Khobar Towers, near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia when a septic 
tanker truck laden with explosives detonated near a military barracks killing 19 Air Force 
servicemen and women.  This asymmetric attack created a shift in the mindset of military 
planners on not only how to protect deployed forces abroad, but also a change in force 
protection philosophy.  Yet, lessons from Korea and Vietnam regarding stand-off attacks 
or even those coming from just outside the exterior of the perimeter seemed to have been 
forgotten as security assets and force protection recommendations at Khobar concentrated 
heavily on a penetration type of attack.18  Several after-action reports indicate that 
General Schwalier, the Khobar wing commander, was passed over for promotion based 
on his “incomplete preparation to defend against a perimeter attack.”19  Additional 
findings from the Record Report and Downing Assessment Task Force highlighted 
                                                 
14 David Shlapak and Alan Vick, Check Six Begins on the Ground, Responding to the Evolving 
Ground Threat to U.S. Air Force Bases (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 34. 
15 Michael Bean, “United States Air Force Security Forces in an Era of Terrorist Threats” (Masters 
Thesis, School of Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1999), 30. 
16 Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, 94. 
17 Fox, 154-157. According to Fox, there were only 19 attacks on air bases located around the world 
from 1979 to 1992.   
18 Penetration attacks are typically conducted at base entry points via explosive-laden vehicles or 
personnel.  They also include small numbers of personnel breaching the base perimeter defenses (fences, 
barriers) in an attempt to gain access to the inner portions of the base where war-fighting assets are 
typically located.  
19 William S. Cohen, “Personal Accountability for Force Protection at Khobar Towers” (Letter 
presented to the President of the United States, Washington D.C., 31 July 1997), 9.  Available at: 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/khobar/cohen.htm, (accessed 12 September, 2006). 
6 
physical security deficiencies, manning and training shortfalls, a lack of organic 
intelligence assets (despite numerous signs of an impending attack), problems with host-
nation forces executing security measures outside the fence line, and improper execution 
of critical infrastructure protection.20   
Nearly 10 years post-Khobar, and on the heels of the 9/11 tragedy, the Air Force 
has moved to a new air base defense doctrine, Integrated Base Defense or IBD.  Earlier 
air base defense doctrine called for compliance-based standards designed to prevent 
single saboteurs or small groups of infiltrators from reaching fixed positions on the 
interior portions of the air base.  With today’s wide threat spectrum, including irregular 
and disruptive sources such as terrorism and insurgency, new base doctrine must be 
capabilities and effects based.21  This calls for IBD forces to “see first, understand first, 
and act first.”22  With the proven successes of guerrilla/insurgent attacks from stand off 
locations just outside the air base (Korea and Vietnam) or directly adjacent to the base 
perimeter (Khobar), this new doctrine calls for defending air bases well past their 
physical perimeter, extending as far out as humanly or technologically possible.  Current 
Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Moseley recently challenged Security Forces 
leadership to “go outside the wire, get their arms around threats to our airfields and 
facilities, and come up with a way ahead.”23  USAF air base defense doctrine was 
nonexistent just several years prior to the Korean Conflict.  It remained relatively 
unchanged and mostly deficient during Vietnam and was again found wanting at Khobar.  
Therefore, it is imperative this new doctrine be implemented properly and executed 
efficiently.    
Ironically, as the Air Force once again works through the growing pains of a new 
base defense doctrine, many terrorism experts and researchers claim terrorists will again 
                                                 
20 Findings from General Wayne A. Downing, Force Protection Assessment of USCENTCOM AOR 
and Khobar Towers, Report of the Downing Assessment Task Force (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Defense, 30 August 1996) and Lt Gen James F. Record, October, 31, 1996. “Independent Review of the 
Khobar Towers Bombing, Part A and B” (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, Air University website. 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/khobar/recordf.htm (accessed on 10 May 2006). 
21 Headquarters, Air Mobility Command.  Integrated Base Defense Concept of Operations (Scott 
AFB, IL: HQ AMC, 17 February, 2006), 2. 
22 Headquarters, United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 3-10.1, 
Integrated Base Defense (Washington, D.C.: HQ Air Force, 20 August 2004), 10. 
23 Security Forces Transformation Newsletter, SF Pentagon Edition, 1:1, 21 March 06, 2. 
7 
seek out and target military installations in the future.  Additionally, they feel that the 
composition of these terrorist groups will mirror those of the insurgent-style enemies 
faced in Korea, Vietnam and at Khobar.  With terrorists unlikely to attempt conventional 
engagements against our superior military forces, Vick stipulates the threat facing USAF 
air bases in the future will most likely resemble those carried out by the VC/NVA in 
Vietnam, and that advances in weapons technology will make defending against stand off 
weapons even more challenging.24  Clifton Dickey, in making comparisons to the 
guerrilla attacks during the Tet Offensive, makes the same argument, arguing future 
adversaries of the U.S. will likely employ some type of asymmetric strategy to diminish 
the effectiveness of our military superiority.25  Shlapak agrees with this concept and adds 
that USAF counters for the standoff threat are somewhat limited, and without a serious 
effort to detect standoff attacks, high-value aircraft and other base operations could be 
jeopardized.  Shlapak adds that he does not foresee a large armored (conventional) 
offensive overrunning an air base as the primary future threat.  Rather, he foresees small 
units of well-equipped, well-trained forces attempting to disrupt USAF operations and 
destroy assets.26  Several recent RAND studies predict Al Qaeda will retain a strong 
interest in striking ‘hard’ (or well protected) targets such as embassies and military 
installations.  They also predict terrorists may strike at military installations and other 
critical infrastructure in rural areas due to their high target value.27  As the war rages on 
in Iraq, Matthew Levitt argues that the U.S. cannot afford to be distracted by the situation 
there, as terrorists may seize that opportunity to strike at hardened stateside military 
installations which could have a devastating effect on the Iraq reconstruction effort.28   
 
 
                                                 
24 Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, 110. 
25 Major Clifton Dickey, “Base Defense for the Air Expeditionary Force: More than Defending the 
Redline” (Masters Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1998), 1. 
26 Shlapak and Vick, Check Six Begins on the Ground, xvi, 15. 
27 Bruce Hoffman, et al, Trends in Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the Future of the 
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D. METHODOLOGY   
By incorporating a historical interpretation of air base defense doctrine over the 
years, observations can be made regarding comparisons of earlier methodologies to those 
being used today or being considered for the future.  Despite the evolution and creation of 
new air base defense doctrine, empirical data from earlier attacks, compared against 
USAF security measures, policy and doctrine in effect at the time, may help determine 
why these attacks were successful and assist decision makers in formulating 
recommendations to prevent them in the future. 
 Indoctrinating the new air base defense policy must prove to be more effective 
and less problematic than its predecessor.  Detailed analysis of air base defense doctrine 
during the Korea, Vietnam and Khobar attacks indicates repeated failures resonating in 
several critical areas:  
 1.) The failure of adequate information/intelligence sharing programs and 
 initiatives (both internally and externally.) 
2.) Insufficient security resources allocated to defending critical infrastructure 
(as well as improper placement/siting of said resources.) 
3.) A lack of technological capabilities aimed at detecting and defeating enemy 
threats away from the air base.   
Therefore, subsequent thesis chapters will examine specific and independent, 
parallel force protection programs pertaining to these core areas, such as the Joint 
Protection Enterprise Network, Critical Infrastructure Program, and various technology 
upgrades to determine their potential impact on the Integrated Base Defense program, as 
well as recommendations for Security Forces’ participation in these programs.  With 
similar mistakes made repeatedly against the ‘old’ insurgent threat, it is absolutely critical 
we avoid making those same mistakes against the ‘new’ threat.  After all, “those who 
cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”29 
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1. Chapter II – Air Base Defense—The Early Years 
Chapter II examines the genesis of air base defense doctrine and how it slowly 
evolved after the United States Air Force became an independent service and was quickly 
thrust into the Korean conflict.  Air base defense implementation and execution errors 
highlighted in Korea lingered into the Vietnam era, and once again Air Force security 
personnel entered an intense conflict on foreign soil with an inadequate and poorly 
developed doctrine.  The attack on Khobar Towers finally gave policy makers and 
military planners the feeling that their air base defense doctrine was lacking fundamental 
aspects of force protection, ultimately leading to the development of Integrated Base 
Defense (IBD). 
2. Chapter III – Where are We Going? 
Chapter III explores some of the differences and similarities between the new IBD 
doctrine and its predecessor, Air Base Defense (ABD).  This chapter also examines 
potential and anticipated enemy attacks/methodologies on air bases and military 
infrastructure and how they compare/contrast to those of earlier air base attacks.   
Chapters IV, V and VI provide accounts of various tactical, procedural and 
doctrinal errors made in the areas of intelligence sharing, critical infrastructure protection 
and technology implementation during the time periods studied.  These chapters also 
introduce several emerging new force protection programs and concepts recently 
developed at the Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force levels this author feels are 
essential in executing a highly effective IBD doctrine, particularly as they relate to each 
core problem area.  Finally, each program/concept is discussed in detail in relation to its 
potential importance in the IBD integration and overall success of the program. 
3. Chapter IV – Information and Intelligence Sharing 
Chapter IV examines earlier doctrinal and procedural errors made in relation to 
intelligence gathering and analysis while performing the air base defense mission in 
Korea, Vietnam and at Khobar. This chapter also focuses on several key sources of 
military intelligence used by Security Forces in base defense planning and how this 
information moves from producer to consumer.  Chapter IV also describes the 
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importance of the Joint Protection Enterprise Network (JPEN) and Security Forces’ role 
in utilizing not only this database-style system, but other information sharing programs as 
well.  
4. Chapter V – Critical Infrastructure Protection Programs (CIP) 
Chapter V describes numerous tactical and procedural errors involving the 
protection of critical infrastructure located on air bases in Korea and Vietnam as well as 
several examples from Khobar Towers.  This chapter also briefly describes the 
Department of Defense and Air Force Critical Infrastructure Programs (CIP) and Security 
Forces’ role in executing this important mission.   
5. Chapter VI – Technology:  A Security Enhancer? 
Chapter VI describes how various technologies were found lacking in Vietnam 
and at Khobar Towers. It also describes various current and future technologies and 
tactics that may potentially be used by Security Forces in defending air bases, however, 
may also be used by the enemy to attack them.  Finally, this chapter discusses several 
planned and current Air Force programs designed to enhance force protection at its 
airbases, and the Security Forces role in this mission.   
6. Chapter VII – Conclusion 
The concluding chapter briefly describes the ongoing Security Forces 
transformation as it relates to the Integrated Base Defense mission.    
As the Integrated Base Defense doctrine continues to emerge and develop, the 
roles and functions of the Security Forces members called upon to perform it will also 
undoubtedly change.  They are now being asked to perform missions and tasks once 
thought to be strictly reserved for Army and Marine infantry units.  The days of securing 
and patrolling only the rear area and/or interior portions of the air base are now long 
gone.  Replacing it are the technologies and tactics employed by Security Forces 
members reaching out beyond the air base perimeter in hopes of detecting adversaries 
much, much earlier.  In order to better understand where it is this new doctrine is 




II. AIR BASE DEFENSE:  THE EARLY YEARS 
Even in friendly territory, a fortified camp should be set up, a general 
should never have to say; ‘I did not expect it’ 
               The Emperor Maurice 30  
A. INTRODUCTION        
Most terrorist groups/insurgents conduct extensive information collection activity 
in order to identify U.S. military weaknesses and vulnerabilities.  Part of this collection 
activity includes surveillance, such as monitoring/videotaping military installations, 
associated critical infrastructure and locations frequented by members of the armed 
services.  There are always two places terrorists are guaranteed to find you; at home and 
at work.  Unfortunately, when we talk about events such as the Beirut bombings of the 
Marine barracks in 1983, Air Force installation bombings in Germany in 1981 and 1985, 
and the Khobar Towers incident in 1996, all of them targeted areas where U.S. 
servicemen and women both lived and worked.  Terrorists normally represent an 
asymmetric-style vulnerability to U.S. armed forces.  That is, they present a threat outside 
the range of what is commonly known as conventional warfare, and as a result are 
difficult to prepare for and counter.  They typically have no regular army, economy, 
territory or population to protect.  This presents a unique challenge to installation/air base 
commanders and those charged with security planning in the armed forces.   
RAND research indicates few, if any; opponents can challenge the Air Force’s 
airpower superiority.31   If their study on asymmetric warfare is correct, RAND 
speculates future adversaries may look to alternative methods of demonstrating their 
hostile intent or countering our airpower supremacy.32  As history dictates, attacks on Air 
Force installations and air bases could be one such alternative.  By taking advantage of  
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readily available forces and/or existing technologies, they may strive to reduce the 
effectiveness of U.S. air operations, temporarily or otherwise, by destroying high-value 
assets and/or critical infrastructure.   
Aware of the importance of air forces not only in the air but on the ground, Giulio 
Douhet suggested that the best defense against enemy airpower was through indirect 
attacks on the enemy’s airfields.  Douhet claimed, “It is easier and more effective to 
destroy the enemy’s aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to 
hunt his flying birds in the air.”33 
Douhet’s focus on air power dominance no doubt referred to air attacks of enemy 
airfields; however, studies have shown ground attacks are an equally effective alternative; 
the consequences of which have been, at times, devastating.  According to a RAND 
study, air base ground attacks occurred at least 645 times in 10 separate conflicts, 
destroying or damaging over 2,000 aircraft in worldwide locations between 1940 and 
1992.34  It should be noted that RAND’s numbers do not account for the numerous 
attacks Afghan rebels conducted on Soviet base camps or the more recent Iraqi and 
Afghan rebel attacks on American forces and bases in that region.  Regardless of the 
precise numbers, one can conclude that attacks on air bases have been and continue to be 
successful in the eyes of the attacking force.   
 As the first Gulf War demonstrated, air power can have a devastating impact on 
the will and gumption of a smaller, weaker enemy.  At times, enemy forces are placed in 
a position of disadvantage through the use of successive bombing raids or overwhelming 
ground forces.  Often, these adversaries, understanding their limitations and unlikely 
victory, employ an asymmetric style of fighting mentioned previously.  This often 
includes, but is not limited to, distracting ground defense forces through the use of 
ballistic missiles or mortar attacks.  Alternatively, they may also attempt to interrupt base 
operations through the use of small insurgent teams of ground forces.35  While numerous 
armies and governments have studied enemy ground attacks throughout the years and 
                                                 
33 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force Office of History, 
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examined methods for countering the threats posed by them, the attacks continue and 
remain a constant danger to the efficacy of battle planning and/or conflict resolution.  
Throughout modern history and the development of what is now known as the United 
States Air Force, Security Forces remain the primary executor of Air Force base defense 
policy.  This chapter will examine a historical perspective of air base defense from World 
War I through the attack on Khobar Towers, as USAF ground forces transformed from an 
air base ground defense construct during the ground wars of the 20th century to what 
would eventually become the Integrated Base Defense concept developed specifically for 
the “Global War on Terror.” 
B. WORLD WARS I AND II 
During World War I, both allied and enemy air units operated from air bases 
ensconced behind massive trenches protecting them from both conventional and 
unconventional (guerilla-type) attacks.  Because of the absence of probing-style enemy 
attacks, allied forces continued to harness all of their base defense energies towards the 
interior portions of their bases and defending aircraft on the ground was typically not a 
concern.  While the intrinsic value of aircraft in combat was realized during this war, the 
nearly non-existent external enemy threat led U.S. Army Air Service (USAAS) leaders 
into a sense of complacency regarding the overall importance of air base security.  This 
improper realization culminated in ownership of a poorly trained and unprepared ground 
force heading into World War II.   
 World War II witnessed the introduction of technologically advanced and more 
lethal aircraft. It was apparent to military strategists that air power would be a vital cog in 
deciding the outcome of the war.  Nazi Germany realized this potential as well, and 
introduced their infamous blitzkrieg or “lightning war” style of mobile warfare designed 
to smash their European enemies.  Allied forces in forward areas often succumbed to 
German bombers which skillfully avoided anti-aircraft weaponry allowing them to 
repeatedly dive-bomb sheltered base defenders.  Meanwhile, German paratroopers 
dropping onto Allied air bases from above placed unsuspecting Allied troops at a 
surprising disadvantage.  Since typical air bases in those days consisted of little more 
than a small patch of grass, they were often difficult to defend, leading to Germany 
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capturing a number of Allied air bases.36  Control of the air became critical, yet 
defending the tools of this trade, aircraft, was not progressing at a satisfactory pace.  In 
1941, the Germans attacked and captured a British airfield in Maleme and subsequently 
took possession of an airfield in Crete.  During the Crete invasion, a large and untrained 
British force was overrun by a much smaller German force.37  These events culminated in 
the United States and Great Britain giving serious thought to the importance of air base 
defense and trained specially-dedicated airfield guardians.  Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill reviewed British air base defense policy and found it wanting.  He declared all 
Royal Air Force members were to be armed and trained…”ready to fight and die in 
defense of their airfields;…every airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air-ground 
men, and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by 
detachments of soldiers.”38  
The United States recognized the need for a similar defense posture for their 
airfields.  In June 1942, the United States Army Air Corps (USAAC) Chief of Staff 
formed the first air base defense battalions, created primarily to defend against enemy 
ground attacks.39  Realizing the importance of outfitting these troops properly, the Army 
trained them in small unit tactics and issued the battalions M-2 half-tracks, heavy 
machine guns, 60mm mortars, tank platoons M1 rocket launchers and self-propelled 
75mm guns.40  The development of these battalions signaled a paradigm shift in the area 
of base defense.  Their primary function was to secure the air base, including tanks, tank 
farms, bomb dumps and radar stations.41  Capable of providing both fixed and mobile 
defense forces, they were given instructions to “hunt down the enemy immediately upon 
receiving information on him” and to “flank him or attack him in the rear as he engages 
fixed defenses.”42  As was often the case with newly-created organizations within the 
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military at that time, these groups were underutilized and misappropriated.  Instead of 
protecting against parachute, glider and ground attacks, base defense personnel 
performed non-glamorous duties such as “guarding the gasoline, ammunition and ration 
dumps, entrances to the Officers clubs and hotels, vacant warehouses and dry cleaning 
establishments.”43   
By 1943, Allied dominance spread throughout Europe and the threats of enemy 
ground attack seemed to dwindle.  Along with it diminished the importance of dedicated 
air base security.  The United States Navy had exercised its own dominance in the Pacific 
theater during the Battle of Midway and destroyed Japan’s military infrastructure to a 
point where they no longer posed a serious threat.  The United States Army Air Force 
(USAAF) recognized this trend and began to deactivate the (still relatively new) air base 
security battalions until they were completely disbanded in 1945 after the Japanese 
surrender to the Allied powers.44  The war had in fact ended, yet a standing air base 
defense policy remained ever-elusive.   
Shortly after the end of World War II, the National Security Act of 1947 formed 
the United States Air Force as a separate branch of the armed services under the control 
of the Department of Defense.  Debate over roles and missions ensued with ground 
defense responsibilities being a key issue.  In 1947, under a joint service agreement 
between the Army and Air Force, each service acknowledged their responsibility for 
defending their own installations.  In 1948, the Key West Agreement attempted to 
identify various base security roles and missions, more specifically for the Army, Navy 
and Marines45.  However, it did not specify an Air Force ground combat mission, or 
specifically determine how the Air Force would defend its air bases.  Hence, as the 
United States prepared to enter the war in Korea, the Unites States Air Force brought 
with it only a vague understanding of its air base defense doctrine and responsibilities.   
C. AIR BASE ATTACKS DURING THE KOREAN CONFLICT 
Upon entering the war in Korea, once dubbed by General Omar Bradley as “the 
wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy,” the United 
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States Air Force, faced with a potential communist enemy of indeterminate strength, soon 
realized it lacked the requisite number of ground defense troops.46  It began to build up 
its air base ground defense forces, expanding from 10,000 Air Police (AP) personnel in 
July 1950 to over 39,000 in December 1951.47   These newly amassed forces entered the 
battle with infantry-type training, armored vehicles and associated weaponry.  Additional 
personnel and new weapons could not hide the fact the Air Force still lacked an adequate 
base defense doctrine.  Prior to entering the fray, the typical Air Police mission consisted 
of preventing thievery, pilferage and trespassing on and around the air bases.  Many Air 
Force leaders felt since installations were typically located in the Army’s defended rear 
area that defending these adjoined areas fell on the responsibility of the Army.  Clearly, 
sufficient guidance was seriously lacking.  On 3 March, 1953, the Air Force published 
Air Force Regulation (AFR) 355-4, Defense – Local Ground Defense of Air Force 
Installations.48  This new regulation prescribed specific actions for installation 
commanders such that they may properly secure their installations from local attack.  The 
new regulation provided specific details on denying hostile forces access to key areas of 
this base in addition to handling attacks such as: 
• Infiltration 
• Guerrilla warfare 
• Civil Disturbances 
• Local airborne, seaborne or ground attacks49 
Responsibility for executing this particular mission rested on the shoulders of 
base defense task forces; typically augmented enlisted men from non-operational 
specialties and trained by Air Policemen.  In addition to training this augmented force, 
AP’s also provided listening/observation posts outside the base perimeter, conducted 
guerrilla detection patrols, and formed a mobile ground fighting unit.   
                                                 
46 Taken from General Bradley’s speech on May 14, 1951 to the Senate Committee on Armed Forces 
and Foreign Relations, The Military Situation in the Far East, Senate Hearings, 
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49 Air Force Regulation 355-4, 1.  
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Additional guidance prevailed, determining that the Army, with its doctrine best 
suited as an offensive force, would remain in specific areas, while the Air Force would 
focus on point, or ground defense of its air bases.50  Still, the Air Force perceived this 
ground defense role as an emergency function only, and typically short in duration.  This 
belief carried over into the mindset that they were incapable of providing sustained air 
base defense operations.   
Despite the potential for damaging attacks upon allied airfields, North Korean 
guerrillas operating in United Nations territory, surprisingly ignored attacking these 
unprepared and policy-confused targets.  A Far East Air Forces Report found that, 
“effective security against sabotage and a workable ground defense system…never fully 
developed on most Air Force installations in Korea.”  They based their findings on the 
fact that drafted plans did not match the threat or were “beyond the unit’s capability to 
execute effectively.”51  
Due to the lack of enemy activity, Air Police units in Korea found themselves 
preoccupied with interior guard duty and other inconsequential duties unrelated to 
defending the base.  While AFR 355-4 was progressive and contained strategic vision, 
there existed a growing disparity between what it was designed to produce and what 
actually happened.  The Air Force was slowly trying to develop functional air base 
defense doctrine, coupled with the required manpower, equipment and training.  With 
what can only be attributed as good fortune, Air Force bases avoided serious threats or 
attacks during the Korean War.  This lack of enemy activity, combined with amended 
intelligence estimates, a new national strategy focusing on ‘containment’, and a postwar 
budget reduction, led to Air Police manning requirements drawing significant 
congressional attention.  Senior Air Force leaders, unfamiliar with the construct and 
vision of its air base defense strategy, could not properly handle congressional inquests 
regarding the need for continued and relatively high manning levels.  Once again, the Air 
Force reduced not only its manpower, but its capability to properly defend its air bases.   
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D. COLD WAR STRATEGY 
With the dawn of the nuclear age, there was suddenly a major shift in national 
defense policy focused on “massive retaliation” to protect its vital interests.  This shift in 
policy brought about significant changes to air base defense doctrine.  The threats of air 
assaults upon air bases or infantries overtly advancing upon the flanks of air bases 
seemed highly unlikely.  Replacing the threats and enemies the Air Force had trained and 
developed doctrine for were the threat of total nuclear war and clandestine attacks by 
teams of highly-trained Soviet agents attempting to disable our nuclear response 
capabilities.  Accordingly, a 1957 Air Staff study concluded the practices currently 
employed under AFR 355-4 were “impractical, unmanageable and incapable of yielding 
defense-in-being consistent with up-to-date estimates and war planning concepts.”52  A 
shift in focus to protecting critical weapons systems, equipment, material and associated 
facilities led to the development of the Internal Installation Security Program, established 
by AFR 205-5 (ultimately replacing AFR 355-4).  This program shifted the previous 
focus from local ground defense and placed a new emphasis on internal reinforced 
security, with an expanded interior guard system to counter covert threats considered 
‘inside the wire’.  Unyielding AP policy enforcement of these critical areas became 
possible through the use of strict personnel access control.  Additionally, small and 
mobile sabotage alert teams (similar to today’s random antiterrorism measure and other 
mobile response teams) provided initial response.  Off-duty Air Policemen and other 
trained base personnel provided a reserve force if required.  This change in policy also 
had other immediate impacts in the AP arena.  The Air Force cut it’s AP overall end 
strength by 20% and closed the Air Base Defense School replacing it with an inadequate 
40-hour preparation course; the only existing source of air base defense instruction for 
any/all base defenders.53   
Difficult to fathom is the fact that despite the ever-changing shifts in air base 
defense policy coupled with the pendulous national defense policies throughout World 
War I, World War II and the Korean War, Air Force installations came out relatively 
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unscathed.  However, the Eisenhower administration’s desire for an expanded interior 
guard concept of air base defense would not bode well with a change in administration 
and yet another shift in national policy, leaving the Air Force unprepared to embrace its 
air base defense mission in Southeast Asia once again.   
E. AIR BASE ATTACKS DURING THE VIETNAM CONFLICT 
As the Kennedy administration announced it would “support any friend, oppose 
any foe” in the assurance and survival of liberty, it brought about another shift in national 
defense policy, with an emphasis on flexible response.54  The President, recognizing 
Communist issues developing in Southeast Asia, placed an emphasis on 
counterinsurgency warfare as he authorized the buildup of the U.S. Military Assistance 
Advisory Group (MAAG) in the Republic of Vietnam.55   
From 1961 to 1964, the U.S. military, primarily in an advisory role, emphasized 
offensive operations, with the Army and Air Force focusing on separate playing fields.  
The Army developed search and destroy tactics, focusing on eliminating insurgent forces, 
while the Air Force leaned on offensive air operations.  The Air Force, still focusing on 
internal security measures for countering Soviet sabotage-type threats, developed no local 
defense capability for themselves or their South Vietnamese counterparts.56  In this 
loosely developed coalition, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) provided 
external and perimeter base defense, while the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) provided 
internal base security.57  For reasons, mostly political, base security assignments for 
advisory units in country rested in the hands of these (often unreliable) augmented forces.  
The ARVN and VNAF not only burdened Air Police personnel with their untrained 
services, but also conflicting personal loyalties and rivalries.  Continuous infighting 
persisted within the upper echelons of these services.  In September 1964, the ARVN led 
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efforts towards an attempted coup against the Saigon government.  After the VNAF 
threatened to bomb them, relations between the two services remained diaphanous 
throughout the Vietnam conflict.58  Fortunately for the Air Police and other air base 
personnel, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Armies (NVA/VC) practically ignored 
U.S and allied air bases throughout this timeframe, resulting in untested capabilities and a 
continued lack of attention on the importance of air base defense.   
 In 1962, the MAAG was reallocated as the U.S. Military Assistance Command, 
Vietnam (USMACV) and immediately Pacific Air Forces Command (PACAF) directed 
its Air Police to strictly enforce all internal security measures within the confines of 
Southeast Asia’s operating bases.59  The Air Force, recognizing their paltry presence 
(approx 280 men)60 in Vietnam, requested a Numbered Air Force staff assistance visit to 
establish a more secure policy directive. The report suggested that “Air Police rely on 
standard Air Force procedures to detect and neutralize sabotage.  It discouraged the use 
of ground force defense methods that entailed unfamiliar weapons and created support 
problems.  While conceding that a large-scale enemy assault might require active USAF 
defense measures, the report warned that stocking more than a single basic load of small-
arms ammunition might invite a VC/NVA attack.”61 
U.S. military personnel on the ground became wary of the often-tenuous 
USAF/VNAF security coalition.  VNAF forces prevented Air Police from guarding their 
own aircraft, leaving them to secure only non-critical cantonment and supply areas.  For 
the first time, the USAF Cold War viewpoint for base defense received serious scrutiny.  
Air Police commanders asserted this concept must be revised and more flexible rules and 
standards devised for the protection of USAF personnel and equipment in limited war 
areas.  Based on field commander’s recommendations, the Thirteenth Air Force launched 
reform proposals, subsequently ignored by both USMACV and PACAF.62  With tensions 
escalating in the region after a Vietnamese attack on a U.S. Navy ship in the Gulf of 
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Tonkin, the U.S. launched their first air attacks on North Korea in the fall of 1964.  With 
the influx of aircraft into the region, military leaders took another hard look at their air 
base defense doctrine and begrudgingly sent several U.S Army officers forward to assist 
with the training aspects of the Air Police and ARVN coalition.63  Subsequently, a month 
after the Tonkin assault, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) conducted a review of air base 
defense procedures in the region and declared them sound (based on the 
recommendations of several top military leaders).64 
Exactly 60 days after the JCS labeled air bases secure in the region, Viet Cong 
guerilla troops launched a ferocious mortar attack on Bien Hoa Air Base.  The base, 
severely unprepared due to RVNAF failures in sounding the alarm coupled with their 
delayed security response, resulted in the deaths of four U.S. personnel with thirty others 
wounded, the destruction of five B-57 aircraft and fifteen others damaged.65  This marked 
the first ground attack on an air base in Air Force history.  Unfortunately, many others 
were to follow.   
The glaring security deficiencies on Vietnam air bases resulted in General Harris, 
Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces, to plead to the JCS for the deployment of Army 
and Marine Security Forces to secure these bases.66  General Westmoreland, 
Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was adamantly opposed to 
this idea.  Westmoreland felt placing these infantry troops into defensive roles would 
ultimately cripple offensive operations.  He ordered all installation commanders to 
initiate (self) defensive efforts and directed that all specialties of all services would 
organize, train and exercise to perform air base security functions at their installations.  
The Air Force interpreted this to mean their security personnel would continue to apply 
their air base defense energy on the internal portions of installations.   
With the persistent focus on defending forward deployed air bases, coupled with 
repeated successful enemy attacks, the Air Force Chief of Staff, realizing Security Police 
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manpower numbers were drastically low in Vietnam, directed the organization of ten 
Security Police squadrons with an associated Security Police training school, stressing 
marksmanship and ground base defense skills.  By March, 1968, the 821st Security Police 
Squadron was the first such unit to form, train, equip and travel to Vietnam.67   
While Air Force security personnel performed adequately in regards to defending 
the internal portions of the base, 96% of the 475 air base attacks in Vietnam were the 
result of standoff weapons with no penetration of internal security.68  With a Cold War 
precept in place, Air Force security personnel focused their energies on the inner and 
cantonment portions of base, and did not adapt to the guerrilla style warfare being used 
by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese whose motives simply were to destroy U.S. and 
allied aircraft and kill or harass American military personnel.  Insurgent forces operating 
in the area relied upon low-level intelligence gathering and reconnaissance.  The Air 
Force base defense doctrine, calling for a static defense posture, simply was not effective 
against the enemy’s modus operandi, and was often quickly compromised. 
Korea and Vietnam taught us that defending air bases calls for an expanded 
ability to detect, deter and defend outside the base perimeter away from critical resources 
and personnel.  With the dawn of asymmetric threats, the continued use of standoff 
weapons, the introduction of suicide bombers and other unconventional methods, the 
scope of defending air bases demanded new and improved doctrine. 
F. A CHANGE IN MINDSET?  OPERATION SAFESIDE 
It is clear that the involvement of Air Force security personnel units during the 
Vietnam insurgency consisted primarily of internal security on remote and often-
vulnerable air bases.  It is also clear they focused primarily on protection against the 
covert threat of sabotage and/or penetration-style attacks on cantonment or inner portions 
of the air base.  The bulk of security personnel in theater had received air base defense 
training focused towards the more conventional Soviet threat; however, the continued and 
often well-planned stand-off (mortar and small arms) attacks by organized NVA/VC 
battalion-sized guerrilla groups on coalition air bases eventually forced a change in 
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mindset.  The Air Force decided to shift its attention from a completely static or 
internally-focused doctrine to one providing well-trained, well-armed and highly 
motivated combat Security Police units capable of repelling enemy raids outside the 
perimeter of the air base and away from critical assets and operations.   
In February of 1968, the Seventh Air Force Commander initiated a request for 
what would officially become the first in a line of highly-trained Combat Security Police 
(CSP) units focused on a new base security concept, one known as “active defense.”69  
The formation of CSP units required a strict selection process as Security Police officers 
and non-commissioned officers were thoroughly screened for selection into what would 
become a fast-paced and physically rigorous training regimen specializing in hand-to-
hand combat, special weapons training and other tasks commonly performed by Army 
Rangers.  The project officer for OPERATION SAFESIDE, Colonel William Wise, was 
quoted as saying, “Local base Security Forces are responsible for the internal protection 
of air bases…and have been very effective against attempted penetrations by saboteurs.  
But when hostile groups overtly attack our base perimeters in large numbers, it is too 
late.”70  CSP units were thought to be the stopgap in preventing the enemy from getting 
close enough to the air base to attack it, even from a stand off distance, which had proven 
to be the Achilles Heel of air base defense up to that point.   
Once operational, CSP units patrolled large areas of jungle and rice paddies, 
formerly the sole responsibility of the oft-inadequate host nation forces, with active 
defense tactics developed during their intense training.  These tactics included daylight 
recon patrols, forward observation and listening posts, operation of tactical motor patrols 
with gun jeeps, sweep and clear operations, relocation of areas of population, as well as 
their primary active defense tactic: the ambush patrol, considered essential in an 
insurgent environment.71  Air Force and Security Forces planners felt through the correct 
placement of combat essential resources adjacent to and outside the base perimeter, the 
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off base mortar attacks could be minimized.  VC/NVA units lacked sophisticated 
intelligence aids and equipment and relied on low-level intelligence gathering, usually 
through reconnaissance methods.  The existing, or static, air base defense posture was 
quickly compromised by that type of enemy activity.   
CSP units deployed to Vietnam made a significant contribution to the overall base 
defense mission through their tactical maneuvers and weapon proficiency and often 
formed and responded to situations in less than an hour after being notified.  Yet, despite 
the contributions of the CSP units to the overall air base defense mission, numerous 
implementation and integration problems are worth mentioning here in hopes to prevent 
similar errors in future programs.  First, the initial placement of the SAFESIDE 
Headquarters at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii made it extremely difficult to communicate 
with the CONUS-located higher headquarters, causing potential oversight and logistical 
challenges.72  Secondly, due to a shortage of available manpower, members of the 
SAFESIDE test unit were called upon to serve as instructors for future CSP units.  These 
men, who had received only Army Ranger training, were neither formal instructors nor 
trained in small unit tactics associated with air base defense.  CSP units who were rushed 
through this training learned land navigation, long-range ambush and recon patrols, 
stream crossing, rappelling and other Ranger-related activities, but air base defense 
operations typical of those experienced in Vietnam was often totally neglected.73  The 
hurried training resulted in CSP units arriving in Vietnam with a distorted picture of the 
mission they were to perform.  Many of the arriving CSP units believed since they were 
given Ranger and specialized training, they were in fact superior to existing/conventional 
Security Police units already in country.  This sparked a fair amount of friction early on, 
which ultimately resolved itself.  Finally, in addition to numerous technology shortfalls 
discussed later in Chapter VI, there were several distinct command and integration 
problems involved with the CSP units.  CSP units arriving in country were never properly 
integrated, with some members called upon to perform normal air base security duties or 
pull shifts inside the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) due to manning shortfalls.  
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There were also scattered reports that some CSP units were more preoccupied with 
killing Viet Cong guerrillas than providing an active air base defense posture.74   
After a hastened upstart to the program, the rotation of CSP units ceased in 
August of 1969 due to both a lack of funding and the increasing withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from the region.  In December, 1969, the SAFESIDE Program was discontinued 
and stateside training ceased. 
All things considered, CSP units performed at a level commensurate to the limited 
substantive guidance and rushed training they received prior to arriving in Vietnam.  As 
Air Force security personnel continue to exist as a HD/LD (high demand/low density) 
asset, and world events continue to push the operations tempo to heightened levels, 
military planners must consider the potential impacts of limited and/or ‘just in time’ type 
training.  Air base defense in austere and hostile parts of the world today call for a 
properly trained force executing well planned and thoroughly developed air base defense 
doctrine. 
G. THE ATTACK ON KHOBAR TOWERS 
The United States has maintained at least a meager military presence in Saudi 
Arabia since the early 1950’s, typically in a training capacity to help the Saudi’s 
modernize their military infrastructure.  Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 changed all 
that as the U.S. deployed over 500,000 military troops to the region to defend Saudi 
Arabia and liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi stronghold.75  King Fahd, the Saudi ruler at the 
time, reluctantly agreed to absorb the masses of U.S. military on the promise they would 
all leave when the conflict ended.  However, those days never came.  Saddam’s 
persistence to avoid cease fire and WMD resolutions led to the seemingly never-ending 
Operation Southern Watch and the housing of a military coalition at the Khobar Towers 
facility near Dhahran.   
History has shown us American military presence in another country comes 
neither cheap nor without hardships.  In November, 1995, terrorists detonated a car bomb 
containing an estimated 200-250 pounds of explosives near the Office of Program 
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Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG), killing five Americans.76  Up 
until this event, security risks in the area were seen as manageable; troops maintained a 
low profile and followed standard security and force protection practices.  Following the 
OPM-SANG bombing, that concept was reevaluated.  The threat level in the region was 
elevated to “high” and extensive improvements were made in all Arabian Gulf region 
facilities.  Intelligence reports indicated new attacks planned against American forces 
were possible, with Khobar Towers listed as a potential target.  After action reports 
indicate security officials at Khobar enacted over 130 separate force protection 
enhancements/security measures to defend against this potential threat.  Physical barriers 
were emplaced, perimeter fencing moved further out from living quarters, entrances 
restricted and hardened and guard forces increased.  The approach was merely one of 
enhancing security of existing facilities despite their overall limitations, and this proved 
insufficient to protect U.S. forces.  Seven months later, a truck bomb exploded near the 
Khobar Towers compound.  The Defense Special Weapons Agency classified the 
explosion equivalent to more than 20,000 pounds of TNT.77  Lieutenant General James 
Record, later called upon to conduct a separate inquiry into the Khobar bombing, stated, 
“This nation must never forget that the bombing of Khobar Towers was not an accident—
it was a cold blooded terrorist act of murder.”78   
Following the Khobar bombing, former Secretary of Defense William Perry 
directed retired General Wayne Downing to conduct an investigation into the 
circumstances and facts surrounding the attacks at OPM-SANG and Khobar, as well as 
an assessment of the overall security of U.S forces in the region.  The Downing 
Assessment Task Force identified 26 major findings and formulated another 79 
recommendations in their report to improve DOD efforts to combat terrorism.79  During 
the Downing investigation, it was learned Security Forces personnel were not briefed on 
the potential threat, no terrorist response exercises were conducted and no weapons 
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training was conducted in country to practice in the environment they were expected to 
defend.  The Task Force ultimately recommended a more comprehensive approach to 
force protection.  While the Task Force recognized an environment free from all attacks 
was not possible, they determined commanders must create a force protection system 
combining training and awareness, advanced technology, increased intelligence, 
enhanced physical security and location-specific protection measures to assure an 
acceptable level of protection for U.S. forces stationed abroad. 
After both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, military planners seemed to forget the 
specific challenges in dealing with an insurgent or guerrilla-style enemy.  They seemed to 
forget the high rate of success their enemies achieved conducting stand-off attacks from 
outside their perimeter.  At the termination of both conflicts, the security posture at air 
bases, both home and abroad, returned to defending against a Soviet-type saboteur threat, 
neglecting the hard lessons learned previously.  After the horrific bombing at Khobar 
Towers, Pentagon officials adopted a radically different mindset on force protection and 
improved intelligence.  Specifically, the Air Force, identifying needs in training, 
intelligence and overall structure, reorganized their forces, changing their name from 
Security Police to Security Forces.  Additionally, they created not only a specialized 
tactical unit (the 820th Security Forces Group), but also the Force Protection Battlelab for 
the creation and testing of new force protection technology.80   
However, the horrific attacks on 9/11 identified, among other things, lingering 
deficiencies in intelligence and advanced technology.  The Air Force came to realize the 
days of traditional air base ground defense doctrine and defending against known 
enemies using conventional methods are now behind them.  Future adversaries, unwilling 
to challenge us conventionally, will resort to what has worked for them in the past; 
unconventional, small-unit attacks upon our military installations and air bases.  Korea, 
Vietnam and Khobar Towers indicate numerous examples of where air base defense 
doctrine has been found wanting in the past.  Therefore, as we look ahead to the future 
security environment and its associated challenges, new force protection strategies and 
procedures are certainly in order.   
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III. AIR BASE DEFENSE: TODAY AND TOMORROW 
A. A NEED FOR A CHANGE 
The history of air base defense is filled with seemingly erratic and episodic 
increases and decreases in security-associated manpower.  Additionally, well-organized 
air base defense doctrine either did not exist or never fully developed during the 
campaigns discussed previously.  Air base defense doctrine, training and manning all 
increased during Korea, only to dissipate soon after the war ended.  Base defense 
planners in Vietnam were faced with a new type of warfare and an enemy persistent in 
executing it.  Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army guerrilla units continuously, and 
most often successfully, shelled Air Force bases with mortars, artillery and small arms 
fire.  Despite gradual advances made in defending against this type of enemy/attack, the 
conventional way of thinking led military planners to believe Vietnam was an isolated 
occurrence and Army or host nation forces would supply external security in future wars. 
The unconventional attack on Khobar Towers summarily led military planners to 
recognize that host nation security forces were certainly not sufficient to counter potential 
enemy threats to air bases and deployed military personnel.  Unpredictable, asymmetric 
attacks by guerrilla or insurgent-type forces usually occur with little to no advance notice, 
often leaving host nation and/or U.S. military forces unprepared.  Host nation and other 
external security forces, often faced with the task of deterring enemy forces before they 
approach U.S. air bases, seemed incapable of stopping these attacks, and enemy forces 
were able to destroy war fighting assets and kill U.S. military members from outside the 
perimeter fence line, away from the focus of Air Force security personnel monitoring the 
interior portions of the base.   
The air base attacks in Korea, Vietnam and at Khobar Towers clearly indicate a 
need for properly integrated and effectively executed air base defense on Air Force bases 
at home and abroad.  In these earlier examples, Air Force air base defense doctrine 
consistently did not maintain the organic capability and meet specific requirements 
necessary to defend its critical assets and infrastructure from asymmetric ground attacks.  
Shortly after the Khobar incident, General Ronald Fogleman, former Air Force Chief of 
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Staff, was quoted as saying, “Security no longer ends at the base perimeter.  We must 
assume responsibility for a much larger tactical perimeter that will keep the threat away 
from our people and our equipment.”81  Therefore, it is obvious that the focus of Security 
Forces can no longer be limited to the interior portions of the air base to successfully 
defeat terrorist and insurgent attacks. Guerrillas and other small tactical units will attempt 
to attack air bases and military infrastructure.  Air base defense doctrine must include the 
capability to view, assess and potentially respond to areas outside the base perimeter and 
as far away from critical resources and personnel as possible.  
B. INTEGRATED BASE DEFENSE (IBD) 
In 2005, the Air Force, recognizing compliance-based security methods designed 
to counter conventional threats were no longer sufficient, adopted the Integrated Base 
Defense (IBD) program as their installation security doctrine.  Functional security 
demands a more adaptive construct to defeat elements of today’s terrorism: irregular, 
catastrophic, asymmetric and disruptive.  With today’s enemies including guerrillas and 
insurgents capable of using weapons of mass destruction and other leveraged technology 
against our forces, compliance-based standards simply cannot match this threat.  New 
approaches towards capabilities and effects-based standards using various risk and 
vulnerability assessments as a foundation to identify critical resources will ultimately 
determine effective countermeasures and tactics to defeat the threat.82  The guiding 
principles of this new defense doctrine include the ability to: detect (to see first), assess 
(to understand first) and respond (to act first), each with the overall objective of keeping 
the initiative away from the enemy.83  
While the elements of “see first,” “understand first” and “act first” are directly 
connected to each other, each element possesses independent conditions designed for 
success.   
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• See first (to ensure the enemy sees last) 
• Relentless intelligence and information capture 
• Detect and identify threats 
• Predict threat courses of action (COA) 
• Understand first (to ensure the enemy understands last) 
• Identify vulnerabilities 
• Tailor base defense plans 
• Know and manage risks 
• Act first (to force the enemy to act last or incorrectly) 
• Determine options 
• Decide first 
• Act to remove threat84 
Since this chapter/thesis is not intended to be a user’s manual for IBD, some of 
the specific functions, capabilities and required tasks are purposely omitted.  However, 
examination of official ‘user’s manuals’ such as Air Force IBD publications and 
CONOPS, uncover several common themes from within the elements listed above.85  
Improved/actionable intelligence sharing (both internally and externally), the 
identification of and directed security for critical assets/infrastructure and an increase in 
assessment/surveillance technology remain essential components of IBD doctrine.  It is 
important to remember these three elements, as they were the same three primary areas 
where this research determined base defense policy failed in the earlier examples, and 
therefore will be examined in great detail in subsequent chapters. 
On the heels of an increased operations tempo and ever-increasing numbers of 
deployed personnel, the Air Force has shifted to a more expeditionary and war-ready 
force.  General Jumper, former Air Force Chief of Staff, said, “Making the Air Force 
truly an expeditionary force will require more than just a light and lethal doctrine, it will 
mean breeding a new generation of air and space warriors.”  He went on to say, “In this 
culture, you have to get back to some basic institutional values; every airman a warrior, 
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every airman a sensor.”86  A reduction in available (non-deployed) security manpower 
places an increased emphasis on risk and vulnerability assessments as well as an 
amplified role in commander’s risk management decisions.  Fewer personnel equates to 
fewer security posts filled, with the exception of several mandated positions, Security 
Forces commanders will need to become actively involved in the placement of their 
remaining sentries. 
With more and more Security Forces’ and other Air Force members deployed in 
support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and others, one of the critical requirements of the 
new IBD doctrine is that every service member, support staff and civilian agency support 
and contribute to IBD while simultaneously fulfilling their primary obligations.87  This 
will not require all installation personnel to draw a weapon and stand watch on an 
installation gate or security post, it simply implies all personnel will maintain a 
heightened sense of awareness of their surroundings and report anything deemed 
suspicious throughout their work day or wherever their duties take them (often defined as 
owner-user participation).  This is akin to the time when General Westmoreland recalled 
all Army and Marine infantry units from U.S. air bases in Vietnam and left U.S. Air 
Force personnel to fend for themselves.  Air Force commanders called for augmentation 
forces, and everyone who was capable provided some level of security on the air base.  
Prior to the IBD concept, Security Forces patrols performing base defense duties were 
relatively small in number and their efforts focused on areas close to critical AF assets.  
With IBD, all airmen (not just security personnel) contribute to the IBD concept, acting 
as a larger ‘security force’, enabling a larger concentration of force on a much wider 
battlespace.   
The lessons of Korea, Vietnam and Khobar have taught us many valuable tactics 
regarding air base defense.  Particularly in Vietnam, we noticed Security Forces waiting 
for emergency situations before responding, and their responses were often quite 
predictable, focusing on defense of the interior portions of the air base.  As Figure 1 
indicates, security responses under the IBD construct will no longer be reactive in nature, 
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but in an effort to preempt the threat, will take a more proactive approach, similar to what 
Operation SAFESIDE tried to accomplish in Vietnam. 
 











Security personnel in Vietnam and at Khobar also lacked efficient and timely 
intelligence, either externally or internally generated.  IBD doctrine calls for and expects 
intelligence to be a key factor in executing security operations to achieve local and area 
dominance.  Security personnel in Korea and Vietnam often relied upon gut instincts or 
what limited ‘just in time’ training they received prior to arriving in theater.  IBD will 
augment improved air base defense training with technologically advanced detection and 
assessment equipment.  IBD doctrine calls for a move from more traditional, static posts 
to more mobile and agile response forces able to cover a larger area more rapidly.  
Removal of dedicated sentry positions in certain areas requires the 
implementation of technological security enhancements to support the response forces.  
While IBD is designed to provide a heightened security presence in both peacetime and 
contingency operations, technology enhancements are vital when/wherever appropriate to 
fill possible gaps left by ground forces.  Commanders, requiring increased situational 
                Prior to IBD                With IBD 
- Reactive in nature 
- Compliance-based defense plan 
- Static 
- Security-functional responsibility 
- Wait for the threat  
- Little reliance on intelligence 
- Predictable 
- Little room for initiative 
- Personal experience/intuition 
- Risks unknown/unmeasured 
- Proactive in nature 
- Defense plan tailored to situation 
- Flexible/maneuverable 
- CC and all airmen responsible 
- Preempts the threat 
- Intelligence is a key element 
- Unpredictable 
- Promotes initiative 
- Supported by technology 
- Knows/accepts chosen risks 
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awareness, will rely on technology to combine all sensor inputs, along with ground force 
assessments, to make quick and accurate decisions.88  
The bottom line is this: to preserve Air Force war fighting assets on the ground, 
IBD capabilities must include anticipating and detecting the enemy as early as possible, 
denying or delaying him through whatever means necessary, and ultimately neutralizing 
and mitigating enemy forces/threats through rapid and strategic deployment of Security 
Forces.    
C. FUTURE ADVERSARIES AND METHODS 
Our adversaries know they cannot compete with AF assets while in the air, so the 
only logical countermeasure for them is to attempt to destroy them on the ground at air 
bases.  The demonstrated capabilities of U.S. airpower, such as those displayed in 
Kosovo and Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, may make Air Force bases a 
high-priority target for future enemies.  Meanwhile, the military fights today with fewer 
overall resources, yet these same resources have higher individual strategic value.  Losing 
one system or critical asset could severely impact overall operational capability and 
mission effectiveness.   
It is clear that air and space operations and their associated assets will continue to 
face a transnational or insurgent type of threat employing unconventional and/or 
asymmetrical methodologies.  Terrorism experts argue that future attacks on military 
installations and/or military infrastructure are extremely likely to occur.  Falling in line 
with bin Laden’s 1996 fatwa calling for light, mobile forces using guerrilla tactics to 
attack U.S. targets and personnel, Bruce Hoffman feels al Qaeda will maintain an active 
interest in attacking ‘hard’, or well protected targets, such as embassies and military 
installations.  Hoffman feels the destruction of these targets, often difficult to penetrate, 
may improve bin Laden’s credentials as a meaningful adversary, potentially building 
upon a support base for additional terrorist recruits.89  Shlapak states that in lieu of large, 
armored conventional forces attacking air bases, we can expect smaller units, well armed 
and equipped and trained in small unit tactics.  He further argues these opponents will 
seek to (1) destroy high-value, critical assets and infrastructure vital to war fighting 
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operations, (2) attempt to disrupt sortie generation or mission flow, and/or (3) create a 
high-profile event with the goal of affecting public opinion and overall public support for 
ongoing military operations in other parts of the world.90  Dennis Drew claims 
insurgencies appear to be the most likely, and perhaps the most threatening, kind of 
conflict the U.S. will face in the future.  He further states these insurgent opponents are 
often more unpredictable, leaving U.S. aerospace and war fighting assets at in increased 
risk to enemy attack.91  As of August, 2003, Iraqi insurgents, using mortars and shoulder-
fired (stand-off) weapons, have fired upon 21 U.S. aircraft at Baghdad International 
Airport; another 9 U.S. helicopters were shot down using the same techniques.92  In 
regards to anticipating enemy action, Paul Wilkinson argues that predicting a likely target 
of future terrorist attacks is not necessarily difficult.  He anticipates over one half of all 
terrorist attacks will involve business or industrial facilities, while at least 5% will 
include government facilities and military air bases.  He further argues that while military 
targets are often hardened, military personnel are roughly equal in vulnerability to being a 
terrorist target.93   
When it comes to terrorist groups seeking to change public opinion or distract 
military interests, Matthew Levitt feels terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan may 
attack hardened military installations both home and abroad, with the ultimate goal of 
disrupting U.S. military operations.  Hoffman and Levitt both suggest U.S. military 
personnel (and infrastructure) would be an irresistible target for al-Qaeda and other 
terrorist groups.94  Claiming the political fate of most modern societies is highly 
determined by what happens in its cities, Ian Lesser feels terrorists seeking to influence 
political conditions will target symbolic targets located in urban settings.95  Wilkinson 
agrees insurgents/guerrillas possess the ability to change public opinion, perhaps to 
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achieve short or long-term political goals.  He argues guerrilla/insurgent leaders firmly 
believe their style of warfare itself is usually not sufficient enough to achieve victory 
against a militarily superior opponent.  Rather, it is when the ‘anti-guerrilla’ side 
underestimates the guerrilla or insurgent threat or simply fails to commit sufficient 
resources to defeating it that this method actually has a chance of success—often having 
an effect on domestic or international opinion.96 
Two fairly recent examples of thwarted terrorist attacks provide evidence our 
adversaries are seeking to attack military targets and installations.  In September 2002, 
German authorities arrested a pair of terrorists, with links to al Qaeda, possessing 287 
pounds of chemicals and 5 pipe bombs in their apartment in Waldorf, Germany.  The two 
were suspected of plotting bomb attacks against nearby U.S. military installations on the 
anniversary of September 11th.97  In August, 2005, Los Angeles law enforcement units 
traced the origins of a newly formed Islamic extremist group operating in Southern 
California.  The group, comprised of two former inmates from a Sacramento prison, also 
included a Pakistani immigrant and a Muslim convert.  Through gas station robberies and 
other illicit activities, the group raised cash to purchase large caches of weapons and 
ammunition.  Prior to their arrest, the group was actively recruiting additional Muslim 
members and conducting surveillance of military air bases in Southern California.  This 
researcher has worked in air base security for nearly 13 years and has witnessed and 
heard of many indicators of terrorist surveillance, probes and/or plots involving military 
air bases.  One can safely assume that for every plot that is uncovered or disrupted, there 
are undoubtedly many that go undetected.   
Hence, it is clear through an examination of the existing literature that military 
installations and air bases remain viable targets to small groups of terrorists or insurgents 
employing asymmetric or unconventional methods to attack them.  As Vick points out in 
his research, large enemy forces are not required to conduct attacks upon U.S. air bases.  
Smaller units using unconventional methods of attack have proven to be quite effective.98  
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He also claims preparing defenses against large-unit attacks should not be completely 
discounted, but expects future adversaries to conduct operations in smaller units or 
networks.  However, what is more interesting, and perhaps even more alarming, is that 
many researchers claim that not only do we face the probability of attacks on air bases 
from similar groups and methods, but that these attacks will also closely resemble those 
seen in Korea, Vietnam and Khobar Towers.  Considering the preponderance of 
successful attacks on air bases in Vietnam were accomplished via standoff weapons, 
Shlapak is concerned that U.S. Air Force capabilities to meet this threat in the future may 
be extremely limited.  VC/NVA mortar attacks were able to easily penetrate and defeat 
perimeter defenses like machine guns and observation posts.  He feels with the 
expectation of our adversaries to utilize this same method of attack, the Air Force is 
likely to lose critical war fighting assets and/or experience major disruptions in military 
operations.99  He further states that with future adversaries resembling those seen in 
Vietnam, air base defenders unable to reconnaissance or maintain visibility on the 
exterior portions of the air base will undoubtedly meet a similar fate.100  Vick agrees with 
this theory, stating the most likely threat facing U.S. Air Force air bases in the future will 
resemble those seen exhibited by the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army in Vietnam.  He 
feels standoff threats and the use of mortars, self-propelled rockets and other external 
attacks will continue to challenge air base defenders.  Vick also stipulates that advances 
in technology, allowing for the use of precision-guided mortars and other more accurate 
munitions, will only make the threat more serious and more difficult to defend.101  Air 
bases typically employ infrared and thermal imagers, security sentries, canine patrols and 
motion-tracking cameras along their perimeter fence lines.  Unconventional adversaries 
will typically not wish to encounter these active layers of defense face-to-face, but rather 
employ tactics that can disrupt military operations from a distance.  Claiming the 
effectiveness of unconventional, standoff attacks similar to that used by the VC/NVA 
during the Tet Offensive, Dickey claims our future adversaries will likely employ some 
form of asymmetric strategy to defeat or diminish the overall effectiveness of the U.S. 
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military might.102  As a result, standoff attacks undoubtedly represent one of the largest 
asymmetric threats to air bases in the future.   
Previous attacks on air bases have also involved small units of attackers 
penetrating the base perimeter and utilizing explosive charges to destroy infrastructure, 
aircraft, or kill U.S. military personnel.  While guerrilla insurgents operating in Korea 
and Vietnam had limited technologies, they often did not detonate ordnance remotely.  
They typically used claymores, trip wires and pressure devices and preferred close-in 
combat.  Recently, we have seen the rapid escalation of explosives used not only in 
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), but also in suicide bombings, with 
an apparent preference towards close combat attacks.  The Marine barracks in Beirut, 
Oklahoma City and Khobar Towers are prime examples of VBIEDs and their potential 
destructive capability. The notable concern over VBIEDs is their overall effects in both 
penetration-style attacks (Beirut) as well as standoff-style attacks (Oklahoma and Khobar 
Towers).  Similarly, we have seen the advent of both suicide and roadside bombs in Iraq, 
and most recently in Afghanistan, produce devastating effects and high numbers of 
casualties on U.S military personnel in those regions.  Al Qaeda and other Iraqi 
insurgents have become quite adept at hiding roadside bombs in burlap bags, food 
containers, vending carts and animal carcasses located along the road.103  An 
examination of Al Qaeda tactics demonstrates their preference for hit-and-run type 
tactics, with strengths existing in both ambushes and road-side bombs.  H. John Poole’s 
research indicates their frequent use of explosives, rocket attacks and indirect fire (similar 
to Korea/Vietnam.)104  Shlapak believes we will continue to see both standoff and 
explosive attacks used in the future with an increase in their lethality based on 
exponential technology gains, often keeping pace with U.S. countermeasures.105   
In addition to the terrorism and security experts, Air Force publications also 
predict potential attacks from unconventional adversaries in the future.  Air Force 
Instruction (AFI) 31-301, Air Base Defense, states, “Asymmetric threats will increasingly 
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challenge base defense forces.  Historically, elements such as special forces, light 
infantry, airborne, airmobile, terrorist, guerrilla and irregular units have successfully 
employed unconventional warfare tactics to harass personnel and destroy vital 
resources.”106  Poole states Al Qaeda has developed a state-of-the-art urban assault and 
street fighting strategy that would undoubtedly impact Security Forces members 
defending air bases in urban areas.  These attacks are typically initiated by rocket 
propelled grenades taking out guard shacks and installation entry controllers.  After the 
initial shock, walls and perimeter fences are breached by hand-placed explosives in 
multiple locations.  Shoulder-fired weapons and command-detonated explosives are then 
typically used to attack key infrastructures and strategic assets.107  While the Viet Cong 
would typically rehearse an attack for weeks or perhaps a month, Muslim insurgents have 
been known to prepare for these types of assaults for years at a time.  They may not be as 
tactically proficient as the Viet Cong, but their perseverance and dedication to the overall 
mission should be a concern to air base security personnel.   
Considering the obvious misapplication of air base defense doctrine and 
procedures during Korea, Vietnam and Khobar Towers, combined with the likelihood we 
may be facing similar enemies using similar attack methods, it is imperative Security 
Forces personnel and base defense planners understand what they are up against and what 
to expect.  Air base ground defense remains a vital mission for the Air Force if it expects 
to maintain its air superiority.  As the nature of ground threats to air bases will 
undoubtedly continue to evolve, it may be difficult to predict which threats pose the 
greatest risk to air bases and their infrastructure.  As our past experiences in Korea, 
Vietnam and Khobar Towers have demonstrated, air base defense forces simply cannot 
wait until the base and its infrastructure are under attack before they take action.  The Air 
Force must find methods of securing their air bases beyond the maximum effective range 
of the security patrols (and their weapons) operating inside the base perimeter.   
In examining the existing literature on air base attacks during Korea, Vietnam and 
Khobar Towers, this researcher identified several common and distinct areas that were 
shown to be problematic for security personnel in all cases.  First, proactive intelligence 
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programs seemed nonexistent, with problems surrounding either a lack of precise 
intelligence, receiving it in a timely fashion and/or obtaining it from participating host 
nation forces.  Better intelligence programs and information sharing in Vietnam and 
Khobar Towers may have prevented the destruction of numerous aircraft and the deaths 
of military personnel.  Secondly, there appeared to be no programs or systems in place to 
not only identify, but primarily to protect critical infrastructure and assets.  Aircraft and 
their associated infrastructure, command centers and vital war fighting resources were 
routinely destroyed in Vietnam due to their improper placement and inadequate defense.  
Additionally, a large military barracks, situated too close to the base perimeter despite 
known threats, continued to house military personnel at Khobar Towers.  Finally, the lack 
of adequate technology, either involving weaponry or detection equipment, proved to be 
problematic primarily in Vietnam and at Khobar Towers.  The use of tactical and 
automated sensors, infrared or thermal imagery and other technologically advanced 
security measures may have also prevented or disrupted these enemy attacks.   It is clear 
further examination into these areas is required to ascertain Security Forces’ current and 
potential involvement in these areas.  Chapters IV, V and VI will discuss these particular 
areas in great detail, identifying previous procedural or doctrinal errors made as they 
relate to air base defense, as well as possible recommended solutions and/or courses of 





IV. INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
A great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still 
greater part is false and by far the greatest part is of doubtful character.   
- Clausewitz 108 
The collection, analysis and timely application of useful intelligence are vital in 
the execution of the air base defense mission.  In the past, intelligence producing and/or 
gathering assets were either non-existent inside Air Force security units or they lacked 
sufficient emphasis to make them a worthwhile commodity.  The lack of focus on a 
working intelligence program allowed guerrilla/insurgents to operate relatively freely in 
Korean and Vietnam country sides and overlooked several rather obvious signs of a 
pending attack at Khobar Towers.  This chapter illustrates some of these early doctrinal 
and procedural errors and describes the importance of a functional intelligence program 
and the dividends they bestow upon the air base defense mission.  In order to appreciate 
the importance of a well-designed intelligence program, one must first understand the 
sources of military intelligence and the process in which it flows to the air base defense 
consumer.  This chapter briefly describes that process as well as the way in which this 
information feeds into several data management and other information sharing programs 
used by Security Forces in the execution of the air base defense mission. 
A. EARLY POLICY ERRORS AFFECTING AIR BASE DEFENSE 
Air Force security personnel, responsible for planning, organizing, and 
conducting air base defense throughout the Vietnam countryside often relied upon the 
functional expertise of engineers and logisticians, but more importantly, intelligence 
analysts and their potential information support.  However, with clear and seemingly 
unending gaps in air base defense doctrine, a functional relationship between security and 
intelligence personnel took several years to develop.   
Since the connective requirement was not established early, ground defense and 
security planners lacked valuable intelligence which they required to set security alert 
conditions, deploy contingency forces and counter enemy forces moving throughout the 
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area.  Instead of providing support to the air base ground defense mission, intelligence 
personnel were immersed in providing intelligence updates for air combat missions.109  
After swift and violent stand-off attacks devastated U.S. aircraft on Tan Son Nhut air 
base during the Tet Offensive, a formal request was made for photo-reconnaissance 
aircraft to conduct an aerial survey of the entire base perimeter.  Upon completion of this 
important mission, photo interpreters were able to locate 176 enemy rocket/mortar launch 
sites, along with a labyrinth of bunkers, trenches and associated storage areas.110  Allied 
aircraft subsequently pummeled these areas and coordinated sweeps by ground forces 
seized several rocket emplacements and an enemy base camp.  The thrill of victory was 
short-lived, however, as future requests for aerial reconnaissance and photo interpretation 
were subsequently denied due to other mission priorities.  Ground defense intelligence 
support was nothing more than sporadic from that point forward. 
Relying upon other sources of support for intelligence, base security officials 
turned to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI or simply OSI) to 
enhance the base defense posture.  Because host-nation security forces lacked adequate 
training and failed to place an emphasis on offensive operations, OSI developed a 
program whereby they assisted the VNAF in training and developing Vietnamese sources 
(usually local farmers or laborers familiar with a specific area) to report information on 
real or potential threats to the allied air bases in the region.  Despite funding and 
occasional information-validity concerns, this source program became one of the most 
fertile sources for tactical warning and base defense intelligence.  As these local 
observers would come across insurgents moving through the area, they would attempt to 
covertly gather as much information as possible regarding their movements and overall 
intentions.  Once information was obtained, it was quickly relayed to the Security Police 
commander and/or director of base intelligence for immediate ground assault and air 
strike planning.  Use of local farmers and other laborers for ground intelligence also 
proved to be quite successful.  From August 1968 through November 1969, these native 
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sources generated 78.3% of all DOD Intelligence Information Reports, accounted for 
nearly 4,000 captured/killed VC/NVA and 300 confiscated enemy weapons.111 
While OSI was combing the countryside for informants, Security Police 
commanders at Vietnam air bases also tried implementing the use of indigenous forces as 
intelligence sources.  They paid Vietnamese civilians with cash or gifts for providing 
information on VC/NVA movements.  While this program scored some initial successes, 
it never really developed, as the funding source required for paying the informants dried 
up quickly and was not replenished.   
After informant funding sources vanished, a grassroots program called the Civil 
Action Program (CAP) began operating on air bases in the region.112  This program was 
geared towards winning over the local populace by providing goods, services and 
construction projects for townspeople in hopes they would provide quality information in 
return.  Unfortunately, the quality of reported information was often untimely, inaccurate 
and/or nonexistent.  The Air Force personnel performing this task were untrained and 
were often ‘volunteered’ for the duty, forced to perform on their scheduled days off.  
Despite several significant civic action projects around Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut air 
bases, those bases came under heavy enemy attack in 1968 with no warning from the 
local populace; a glaring example of the program’s overall deficiencies.  Needless to say, 
this program never fully developed as anticipated.  
Since lead intelligence agencies and other base defense personnel (such as the 
Marines) were too preoccupied to provide quality intelligence, and the local populace 
provided sporadic, often useless information, the SP’s, out of necessity, plunged into 
several internally-created programs to glean the precious knowledge their ground forces 
were lacking.  Security Police units created organic intelligence positions ‘out of hide’, 
usually consisting of one officer and one non-commissioned officer responsible for their 
air base and a designated geographical area surrounding it.  However, while these self-
generated positions did the best they could tracking enemy positions and preparing 
weekly intelligence summaries, they lacked the proper intelligence training that would 
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have made them efficient collectors and analyzers of local intelligence.  It was not until 
the arrival of the SAFESIDE units that fully trained SP’s with intelligence analyst 
training arrived in country.  Unfortunately, it was too little too late, as the bulk of those 
units arrived just prior to the pullout of U.S forces.   
Despite advancements in intelligence collection and analysis techniques, 
limitations and shortfalls still existed some 20 years after the Vietnam experience.  
Investigating commissions for the Khobar Towers incident cited the failure of 
intelligence assets on the ground there to provide specifics on how, when and where an 
attack may occur as a contributing factor in the tragic 1996 terrorist bombing of the 
military barracks.  Retired General Downing was quoted as saying, “DOD needs to 
improve intelligence operations.  Military officials were warned of terrorist threats to 
U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, they had the time and motivation to reduce vulnerabilities, 
but it was not enough.”113  Downing added that despite the fact intelligence did not 
provide specific information, a considerable amount of threat information was available 
that indicated terrorists were operating in the region and that Khobar Towers was a 
potential target.  Downing’s report also claimed the Khobar base commander suffered 
from an inefficient intelligence chain of command, which focused almost entirely on the 
air threat during Operation Southern Watch.  Downing also added tactical details were 
lacking due to a near absence of human intelligence assets.  He recommended more 
people and more money funneled into that program to prevent future terrorist attacks.  
The Long Commission Report, commenting on the lack of human intelligence 
capabilities, stated they were “neither precise nor tailored to the commander’s needs.”114 
While many of the findings from both the Downing and Record Reports are 
classified, several were listed in the unclassified version.  Finding 9 from the Downing 
Report stated theater and national intelligence communities were deficient in their 
abilities to conduct in-depth trend analysis as well as determining the overall intentions 
and capabilities of terrorist groups operating in the region.   Finding 10 cited the 
misapplication of threat level assessments by both the Department of State and DOD, 
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causing confusion for the intelligence consumers at the base level.115  Specific to 
Security Police units operating in the area, Finding 11 identified the lack of an organic 
intelligence support capability within the SP units negatively affected their ability to 
perform the critical base defense mission.  Because Security Police units assigned to 
Khobar were typically not briefed on the force protection mission and current threats in 
the region, the Downing Report recommended an organic intelligence asset be provided 
to SP units performing air base missions.116  Finding 14 described an available 
communications network that supported the flow of intelligence through the upper 
echelons of command, yet field units often lacked the proper clearances to gain access to 
the required information.  Information is useless if the consumer, the one relying upon 
timely, accurate information, cannot access it due to classification restrictions.   
There were also several failures on the part of OSI in relation to threat assessment 
information.  Several OSI special agents (correctly) identified the potential for an attack 
from outside the perimeter, but these recommendations were never given to the 
installation commander.  Additionally, upon completing an assessment of physical 
security on the base, one OSI agent recommended the construction of a blast mitigation 
wall to his supervisor.  This information never reached the base commander because the 
OSI supervisor, believing the blast wall had been discussed and rejected previously; felt it 
was an unwarranted recommendation.117   
Finally, while the details of another finding describing host-nation security 
support are still classified, it is no secret the Saudi security personnel were not only 
inefficient in the performance of their duties, but generally refused to act upon 
suggestions/recommendations or potential threat information provided by Air Force 
security personnel.  Saudi officials were quick to point out that security at Saudi 
installations was inherently their responsibility, and that U.S. personnel were not allowed 
to extend force protection measures beyond the installation fence line.  Security Police 
members reported numerous suspicious incidents just prior to the Khobar bombing 
involving reports of surveillance by Middle Eastern men and another incident involving 
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the driver of a vehicle ramming a jersey barrier adjacent to the installation.  While the 
Saudis dismissed these reports entirely, the Security Police unit incorporated numerous 
internal security measures, including the posting of roof-top sentries at night and 
updating building evacuation plans.  Despite the lack of host nation support, and their 
apparent disinterest in viable intelligence, it was precisely these security measures that 
potentially saved the lives of dozens of airmen on the night of the bombing.118 
Despite numerous findings and recommendations following the Khobar incident, 
the proposed force protection enhancements discovered during the ensuing investigations 
never fully developed and the creation of antiterrorism and force protection guidance was 
slow to mature.  Meanwhile, the Air Force relocated their forward operating bases from 
urban and residential areas to more austere, isolated locations in hopes the increased 
stand off distance would prevent future terrorist attacks.  Yet, it was not until the horrific 
events of 9/11 that we realized the intelligence problem persisted throughout many 
military, federal and state channels.  This lingering problem demands immediate 
resolution at all levels.  Part of the ultimate solution resides with the gathering of useful 
and actionable intelligence from known and reliable sources.  
B. SEVERAL SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE FOR AIR BASE DEFENSE 
PLANNING 
Transnational terrorism, rival military aggression, proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and political instability are just a few of the primary threats to our 
nation, our citizens, our military and our political and economic interests.  In order to 
prepare for and prevent terrorist-related acts, intelligence must be accurate, timely and 
provide answers for the questions: who, where, how and when.  During Korea and 
Vietnam, the use of informants/host nation forces and other marginal sources of 
intelligence often resulted in inadequate or untimely (or both) intelligence reporting.  
Intelligence gathering can no longer be limited to just those sources.  The importance of 
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integrating all-source intelligence and analysis is the key to ‘connecting the dots’.  No 
single agency or intelligence function currently maintains all the significant information 
required to properly defend this nation.119   
Traditionally (meaning prior to 9/11), terrorism-related intelligence was obtained 
from sources outside the United States, and typically via intelligence agencies 
specifically.  Meanwhile, federal, state, local and military law enforcement focused on 
domestic issues, primarily criminal in nature.  U.S. intelligence agencies traditionally 
collect information which is vital to the protection of this nation, while law enforcement 
agencies initiate arrests and attempt to collect information for criminal indictments.120  
Prior to 9/11, there was no specific or directed intelligence function for most state, local 
or military police entities.  Ultimately, the September 11th attacks fell into uncharted 
territory, an area that caught both the unsuspecting intelligence and police agencies 
unaware.121   
The events of 9/11 changed the rule book, and the hierarchy of traditional 
intelligence roles is still evolving.  Buzzwords around the Pentagon and Department of 
Justice these days include “information sharing,” “intelligence fusion” and “data mining.”  
There are obvious advantages to sharing information, and the DOD has recognized that in 
recent policy transitions and recommendations for an increased role.  At the micro level, 
and specific to air base defense intelligence planning, Security Forces units must form an 
unassailable trifecta with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations and the base 
intelligence office (IN) to ensure timely and worthy intelligence flow specific to their 
parent air base/surrounding area.  However, Air Force base defense planners must also 
learn to rely upon other outside sources of intelligence in formulating their security 
defense and response plans.  Establishing intimate working relations with federal 
military, law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as adjacent police 
municipalities will also be part of the formula to success.   
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Leading the charge for the DOD in proactively seeking and obtaining the 
intelligence required for proper execution of the CONUS air base defense mission is U.S. 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM).122  This rapidly developing organization is quickly 
blending the military into the homeland defense mission.  Normally called to action under 
‘extraordinary’ circumstances, NORTHCOM specializes in shooting down hijacked 
aircraft, explosive ordnance disposal, special military operations and of particular interest 
to Air Force base defenders, intelligence collection within U.S. borders.   
Since its inception, NORTHCOM has developed cooperative, intelligence-sharing 
relationships with numerous federal, state and local governments.  The Pentagon 
inspector general approved the placement of military special agents (investigators) inside 
the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) all throughout the country.  They are 
responsible for identifying threats to military communities/air bases within the cities and 
neighborhoods they operate in.  In the formation of joint interagency coordination groups 
(JIACG), NORTHCOM has partnered with domestic law enforcement agencies such as 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as well 
as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) to name just a few.123  In an effort to expedite intelligence analysis 
and dissemination across a greater spectrum of agencies and partners, NORTHCOM also 
participates in a liaison exchange program with the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Joint 
Intelligence Task Force–Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Coast Guard and National 
Guard Bureau.  Through the numerous coalitions NORTHCOM participates in, air base 
defense planners have access to an exponentially greater volume of useful and actionable 
intelligence than they did in previous eras.  Additionally, through the implementation of 
expansive technology, intelligence consumers, such as Security Forces, are able to access  
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NORTHCOM anti-terrorism intelligence products on the NCTC’s website creating a real-
time, nationwide, on-line display of potential threats and vulnerabilities specific to their 
areas of concern.124   
While much of the information used to support air base defense planning comes 
to NORTHCOM via the FBI and CIA, another source of information is the 
Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA).  Created in 2002, their charter is to protect 
Defense Department personnel and infrastructure from terrorism and espionage.125  
Coming as a surprise to some, they collect and analyze intelligence and perform 
operations not only abroad but also within the United States.  Much is not known about 
this agency whose expenditures and overall size remain somewhat secretive.  What once 
was simply an agency responsible for oversight on military counterintelligence, has 
become a living, breathing entity consisting of nine directorates and in increasing scope 
of authority.126 
CIFA’s Directorate of Field Activities is a vital player in demonstrating the 
growth of Pentagon activity within our borders.  In addition to preserving critical military 
assets via roving patrols and surveillance of threatening personnel inside the United 
States, they can provide real-time intelligence support in hostile areas around the globe to 
protect military forces and infrastructure from terrorist threats.  Another CIFA 
directorate, the Counterintelligence and Law Enforcement Center, categorizes and 
measures potential threats to DOD personnel and infrastructure from foreign intelligence 
services and clandestine terrorist organizations.127 
Although their methods may be somewhat controversial, CIFA manages and 
maintains several critical terror information databases.  One such database is dedicated 
solely to collecting and analyzing Threat and Local Observation Notices (TALONs), 
which includes information obtained from Security Forces and/or OSI investigators 
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involving possible terrorist activity on or around their air bases.128  Another, somewhat 
more delicate database, involves a ‘data mining’ operation consisting of a large data sets 
of public records, intercepted communications and other ‘actionable intelligence’.129  
CIFA’s Assessments and Technology Directorate quickly analyzes this information and 
shares it with federal, state, local and military law enforcement agencies.  While the data 
lists are living, breathing documents, hundreds of foreign terrorist suspects operating 
inside the U.S. remain in this database.130  Recently, DOD authorized CIFA to formulate 
and task domestic investigations and counterintelligence operations to various military 
services with the purpose of centralizing all counterterrorism intelligence collection 
activity.  This will allow CIFA to designate criminal and counterterrorism missions for 
over 4,000 Army, Navy and Air Force investigators.   
AFOSI, which has increasingly been involved in terrorist threat detection and 
deterrence, has approximately 2,000 agents home and abroad and routinely partner with 
Air Force Security Forces units in criminal investigations and anti-terrorism planning.131  
Greater cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement/security allows for not 
only more proficient follow-up investigation, use of resources/time, but ultimately 
increases the number of potential intelligence trails each agency can monitor.132  When 
AFOSI shares threat information with Security Forces (or vice versa), superfluous 
information is often eliminated, resulting in more efficient and timely base defense 
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planning.  This enhanced partnership is remarkably better than the AFOSI/Security 
Forces relationship that existed during the Vietnam and Khobar Towers periods. 
With a growing emphasis on shared intelligence and participation in intelligence 
fusion centers such as the NCTC, JTTF’s and the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC), it 
is imperative Air Force Security Forces stand ready to implement policies and directives 
geared towards accomplishing this new joint mindset.  Fusion centers, at state and federal 
levels, continue to emerge as communities attempt to establish anti-terror coalitions.  
There are now over 100 JTTF’s located across the country, with plans to develop 
additional centers in the future.133  With an increasing role of DOD personnel 
participating in or maintaining positions on several of these fusion centers, the possibility 
for obtaining timely and valuable base defense intelligence increases dramatically.  No 
longer do the base defense planners have to wait (or pay) for information, typically 
inaccurate or insufficient, to trickle down to them from paid informants or host nation 
forces.   
The unwillingness to share information or work collaboratively towards a 
common goal proved quite costly in Vietnam and at Khobar.  Today, with Security 
Forces obtaining much of the intelligence required for base defense planning through 
both federal and civilian law enforcement/intelligence channels, it is imperative this 
relationship remain vibrant and openhanded.  Security Forces planners should expect an 
increasing role in the processing, commingling and application of useable intelligence as 
relationships with these valuable intelligence sources continues to develop.  One way in 
which this merger is evolving is through the use of computer database programs and 
shared real-time information between consumers.  Security Forces and other base defense 
planners play a vital role in performing this function.  
C. THE JOINT PROTECTION ENTERPRISE NETWORK (JPEN) AND 
SECURITY FORCES’ ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for information sharing across 
all levels of government, particularly through the use of computer databases allowing for 
all (authorized) agencies to tap into current and developing information as it is collected 
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and analyzed.134  The document also recommends ”…Homeland security intelligence and 
information must be fed instantaneously into the Nation’s domestic anti-terrorism efforts.  
Those efforts must be structured to provide all pertinent homeland security intelligence 
and law enforcement information—from all relevant sectors including state and local law 
enforcement as well as federal agencies—to those able to take preventive or protective 
action.”135   
The evolving nature of the terrorist threat and its ability to affect portions of 
society previously thought to be impermeable has resulted in greater demands for sharing 
information and intelligence.  Developing technologies, capable of exponential 
information processing are being developed and implemented across all levels of 
government to help in the terror battle.  Simultaneously, methods to categorize and access 
(data mine) this material are being developed that will combine the strengths of both the 
intelligence and law enforcement/military communities, and provide the functionality and 
necessary availability to those “sworn to defend” at every level of government.136 
Data mining databases have been designed and/or incorporated into mainstream 
intelligence gathering such as DARPA’s Total Information Awareness (TIA) system 
which was ultimately shelved due to its alleged controversial foundations137 and DIA’s 
Joint Intelligence Task Force Combating Terrorism database.  According to an 
Associated Press article, police and other government security workers have come in 
direct contact with over 6,000 suspected terrorists over the past 28 months.138  Many of 
these suspected terrorists were identified operating on or near military installations or 
infrastructure.  A list of over 200,000 names containing known or suspected terrorists is 
maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), who serves as an advisor for law 
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enforcement personnel on managing this type of data and how to engage personnel on the 
list when/if they encounter them.139  Managed and implemented effectively and within 
the boundaries of the law, terrorist databases can play a key role in Security Forces’ 
antiterrorism and IBD effectiveness.  
In the past, AFOSI, the base Intel office and Security Forces personnel would find 
themselves on their classified work stations searching through dozens of websites trying 
to locate a single piece of interesting and/or useable data.  Often when applicable 
information was finally located, it was compartmentalized (a widely-practiced pre-9/11 
phenomenon), and not properly analyzed or distributed to those on the front lines who 
required it.  With technology evolving on both sides of the playing field, it is imperative 
military leaders/planners are able to quickly ‘connect the dots’ of air base intelligence, 
and preferably from a single source.140   
Effective 1 February, 2006, NORTHCOM mandated the use of the Joint 
Protection Enterprise Network (JPEN) for all military bases falling under NORTHCOM’s 
chain of command.  This web-based interactive tool serves as an intelligence source for 
all NORTHCOM military installations allowing for the collection and dissemination of 
suspicious activity reports (SAR) in an effort to deter, prevent and defeat threats and 
aggression aimed at the United States.  JPEN is an interactive web-based network that 
provides near real-time sharing of invalidated (unclassified) force protection information 
to all participating DOD installations.  The desired end state is for every DOD installation 
and facility within NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility to have access to this system 
and routinely participate by entering collected SARs into the system.141  While this 
section is not intended to be a JPEN user’s manual, it is intended to demonstrate JPEN’s 
various capabilities and procedures corollary to existing Security Forces’ functions as 
well as demonstrate the system’s potential capabilities in enhancing and executing the 
IBD mission.  
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While any military member or civilian, either on or off the military installation, 
can report SARs or potential threat data, Air Force Instruction 10-245 stipulates the three 
primary installation focal points for gathering threat data are the Installation 
Antiterrorism Officer, Security Forces and AFOSI.142  Coincidentally, these three entities 
also serve as the primary collection points for JPEN threat data from around the 
installation and servicing community.  The Antiterrorism Officer, working directly for 
the installation commander, is responsible for collecting and entering antiterrorism/force 
protection (AT/FP) events from other Threat Working Group (TWG) members from 
around the installation.143  Security Forces personnel will enter JPEN data via the 
terminal located in their Security Forces Control Center (SFCC) which is the equivalent 
to a civilian 911 dispatch center, and where JPEN is monitored 24 hours a day.  Finally 
AFOSI personnel collect AT/FP observations, including Eagle Eyes reports (covered 
later in this section), and enter them into JPEN as appropriate.  Wolfowitz stated TALON 
reports, initiated by concerned citizens and military members (verified and authored by 
AFOSI) would include surveillance of DOD facilities/air bases, tests of security and 
elicitation attempts.144  The information contained in a TALON report may be 
incomplete or unverified, but the goal of the program is to provide rapid reporting 
thereby allowing near real-time access of potential probes or surveillance to authorized 
participants of the program.  On the other end of this process, CIFA collects and analyzes 
JPEN and TALON information via a daily report for potential networking throughout the 
counterintelligence community, particularly with JITF-CT. 
By providing a database for local and regional trends pertaining to potential 
terrorism threats and force protection issues, JPEN provides an additional source of 
information for installation threat analysis.145  In particular, the Security Forces role in 
this process is to partner with AFOSI in analyzing JPEN data to determine specific 
vulnerabilities, trends and possible mitigating factors.  Tactical users of the system, such 
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as Security Forces members or contracted security personnel guarding the installation 
gates can monitor the system at the same time strategic decision makers view the same 
data.  Security Forces-specific information required for JPEN entries include what are 
called Force Protection Event Categories such as Be On the LookOut (BOLO) and 
vehicle turn arounds; both primarily handled at installation entry gates.  Such a tool, if the 
technology were available during the Vietnam era, would have allowed for base defense 
planners to track and identify specific and reoccurring trends involving VC/NVA stand-
off attacks and plan countermeasures accordingly.    
JPEN would not be a significant or useful tool if its real-time data was not made 
available to those charged with managing and controlling crisis situations.  Therefore, 
NORTHCOM plans to link JPEN into Department of Homeland Security, Department of 
Justice and local law enforcement data systems to enhance the information sharing 
partnership.146  Additionally, JPEN is intended to assist military commanders in meeting 
their antiterrorism and force protection (FP) responsibilities by disseminating FP 
information in a timely fashion both horizontally (with other installations) and vertically 
(up and down the chain of command).147 
With the JPEN program and its implementation at NORTHCOM installations a 
fairly recent requirement, the overall impact of this program remains to be seen.  
However, in support of NORTHCOM’s overall AT/FP mission, JPEN offers an 
opportunity to share information throughout DOD and other participating agencies unlike 
any seen in past decades.  Competency, accuracy and timeliness of reporting are crucial 
elements of intelligence sharing and the interface process missing in days past and are 
required to make JPEN a successful venture for air base defense planners. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The information sharing challenges illustrated by intelligence failures in Korea, 
Vietnam and Khobar Towers, and more recently, by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, illustrate 
the requirement for faster and more integrated information sharing capabilities between 
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federal, state and local authorities.  In an effort to ‘break down the walls’ and ‘connect 
the dots’, Security Forces commanders, both stateside and deployed, must proactively 
seek quick and efficient methods of gaining the actionable intelligence required to 
perform the IBD mission.  In an effort to ensure the success of the JPEN program as well 
as the daily fulfillment of intelligence requirements, SF policy makers and planners 
should follow several recommendations: 
1.   An antiterrorism initiative called “Eagle Eyes” was developed by  AFOSI 
 and has built foundations all around the world.  The program encourages Air 
 Force members and local citizens to report possible terrorist planning activities 
 observed during normal daily interactions.  The program also provides for rapid 
 follow-up investigations and information sharing at all levels of Air Force 
 command as well as with interested law enforcement agencies.  Recently, OSI 
 detachments and Security Forces squadrons joined together to establish local 
 reporting procedures for effective implementation of this program.  Security 
 Forces’ participation in this program is vital, as most suspicious activity is 
 reported via the SFCC.  The Integrated Base Defense doctrine relies upon 
 ‘sensors’ or people reporting information, from areas both on and off the air 
 base.  Once a call comes into the SFCC, the SF representative must notify AFOSI 
 for possible follow up investigation and/or a joint security response to the scene.   
 Proper promotion and integration of the Eagle Eyes program (or any 
 similar programs under different names) is also vital to ensure the local 
 community understands the program’s reporting criteria.  Newspaper articles, 
 leaflets, website information and SF/AFOSI publicity methods make the 
 community aware of the program while simultaneously informing them which 
 types of activities normally qualify as suspicious.148  Security Forces members 
 would do well to promote this program and its many benefits to the populace 
 occupying the areas around their defended positions.  Whether it is a rural area 
 adjacent to a stateside military installation or an urban area located near a remote 
 air base in another region of the world, getting the local populace to report 
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 accurate and timely information (something missing from the Korea/Vietnam era) 
 only benefits the air base defense mission. 
2.  Security Forces members can promulgate an information sharing 
 environment through the use of an effective and well-known crime  deterrent 
 method called community policing.  Engaging with the younger crowds at the 
 Youth Centers and base sporting events provides an outlet for 
 children/adolescents to report any observed suspicious activities.  Additionally, 
 setting up information booths at the Base Exchange during National Night Out 
 and National Police Week provide useful outlets for information dissemination to 
 the base community.  By establishing a community policing ‘hub’ or office within 
 base housing, SF units not only provide a sense of ownership in the crime/terror 
 fighting process, but an environment where base residents can establish a 
 relationship with their base police.   
3. Intelligence briefings offered by the wing intelligence unit and/or AFOSI 
 remain constants in the intelligence and information collecting and sharing 
 process.  Regularly scheduled intelligence briefings given to both Security Forces 
 leadership and junior enlisted members offer the opportunity for both strategic 
 planning and operational enhancement.  While these intelligence briefings 
 typically focus on international events and terrorist planning activity, 
 interpreted data can be incorporated into daily SF functions.  SF commanders and 
 leadership owe it to their troops patrolling the perimeter, searching commercial 
 vehicles entering the installation or working the primary installation entry points 
 to provide them with accurate and timely information pertaining to their relative 
 assigned duties (particularly during contingency operations and/or elevated 
 threat conditions.) 
4. SF commanders (or a designated representative) should log onto the 
 Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) on a regular  basis to review 
 and potentially acquire threat-related data pertaining to their air base defense 
 mission.  Several key sources on the SIPRNET generate daily reports pertaining 
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 to specific areas, several of which could prove to be useful in determining policy 
 or plans to counter potential threats.   
5. As of this writing, Security Forces squadrons are in the midst of a 
 reorganization in regards to their overall structure and composition (Figure 2).  
 They have recently received approval to align themselves into the “S” 
 function staff structure.  The “S” function configuration potentially standardizes 
 the overall SF structure in both home station and deployed  environments.  This is 
 yet another example of how SF units can internally manage intelligence data and 
 requirements using organic assets.  Although attempted (unsuccessfully) during 
 the Vietnam era, SF commanders must now ensure they utilize this new asset for 
 enhanced collection and dissemination of intelligence related to each unit’s 
 overall force protection mission. 
 










6. SF commanders must continue to actively participate in and 
 encourage proactive action in various physical security and force protection-
 related planning groups such as the Threat Working Group, Force Protection 
 Working Group and Installation Security Council.  All of these groups are 














 satisfy the requirement.  SF Commanders and Installation Antiterrorism Officers 
 must promote positive groupthink and the solicitation of potentially 
 groundbreaking methods of securing their installations.  During potential or 
 actual contingencies, SF commanders should possess current threat data and 
 intelligence to assist in the development of potential countermeasures and/or to 
 advise the installation commander on potential actions to be taken. 
7. While it may not always be logistically of fiscally feasible to maintain 
 a permanent SF presence in many of the fusion centers located around the 
 country, a working, functional relationship should be sought between SF members 
 and those with seats at the fusion centers.  If a SF unit is unable physically to send 
 a representative to these fusion centers, SF units should be added to DHS and 
 JTTF mailing lists for their security and information bulletins.  At a minimum, SF 
 units should work to develop a strong and functional relationship with both local 
 and federal police jurisdictions within their area of operation (including joint 
 planning, exercises and training.)   
Timely and efficient intelligence is critical to determining the overall threats to 
the air base, its personnel and war fighting components.  Working together with their 
AFOSI and intelligence counterparts, Security Forces play a vital role in a typical AF 
installation’s force protection triad.  Thorough integration and active participation in 
programs such as Eagle Eyes, JPEN and intelligence fusion centers can and do enhance 
an installation’s overall security posture.  The old cliché “knowledge is power” is only 
true these days if it is knowledge shared.  
Useful and actionable intelligence is useless unless it is applied quickly and 
efficiently.  One area where base defense planners failed in the past and need to improve 
upon for the future is applying known threat and associated vulnerability intelligence to 
the protection of their critical infrastructure (CI) and resources.  Possessing actionable 
intelligence is useless if you do not have the infrastructure and assets to execute offensive 
and defensive countermeasures.  Chapter V explores how mistakes involving CI were 
made in the past and how Security Forces play a fundamental role in defending these 
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V.  CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
The majority of bases do not have a positive approach or active planning 
program for the protection of their operational assets…There are no 
criteria established for the construction of air bases in a combat 
environment. 
Seventh Air Force Base Defense Study Group, 1967.149 
The execution of many war fighting missions relies upon the functionality and 
availability of critical infrastructure and associated key assets.  In the past, base defense 
planners often overlooked the importance of proper siting and/or sufficient security 
resources assigned to defend them.  With the ongoing mission in the Middle East, air 
bases are being constructed in some of the most hostile parts of the globe.  Closer to 
home, the threat of violence and attacks on stateside bases remains a constant and ever-
present threat.  In the midst of all of this, the proper defense of critical military 
infrastructure and assets remains one of the highest priorities for Security Forces.  This 
chapter describes some of the earlier doctrinal and procedural errors executed during the 
defense of various critical infrastructures on bases in Korea, Vietnam and at Khobar.  It 
also briefly describes the Department of Defense and Air Force Critical Infrastructure 
Programs (CIP) and Security Forces’ role in executing those important missions within 
the IBD arena.   
A. EARLY POLICY ERRORS AFFECTING AIR BASE DEFENSE 
An examination of Air Force air base defense history exposes a doctrine with an 
apparent short attention span for the protection of air bases and associated critical 
infrastructure against ground threats, particularly those of an asymmetric or 
unconventional nature.  After Korea and Vietnam, the Air Force reduced security 
manning and paid little attention to an air base defense doctrine repeatedly found 
wanting, especially post-Vietnam.  As a result, a lack of continuity for security operations 
developed and carried over into the Khobar attack which ultimately caused an awakening 
for the protection of both personnel and priority assets and infrastructure at air bases in 
the far corners of the world as well as those within our own borders.  
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Prior to entering the war in Korea, the Air Policemen mission consisted mostly of 
preventing thievery, pilferage and trespassing on its stateside bases.  Protection of critical 
assets and infrastructure was not a primary concern for them, and this mission-focus 
carried over into Korea.  Since the Air Force had only recently split from the Army Air 
Corps, many Air Force leaders felt that since installations were typically located in the 
Army’s defended rear area, it was the Army’s responsibility to defend them.  A full year 
into the Korean conflict, the Air Staff and other military leaders were receiving reports 
from the field that the Air Force still had no viable air base defense doctrine.  In the Air 
Force’s first attempt at base defense guidance, Air Force Regulation 355-4 directed Air 
Force installation commanders to deny enemy access to buildings, facilities, equipment 
and other critical infrastructure.  While this early attempt to identify and defend key 
assets sounded good in theory, it called for security response only in emergencies and did 
not include guidance for “sustained ground defense operations.”150  Air Force security 
members were fortunate their inadequate base defense doctrine was mostly unchallenged 
by Korean guerrillas operating in the area.  Critical infrastructure, including aircraft, 
barracks and fuel/weapon storage areas would have undoubtedly been lost during enemy 
attacks.  
After Korea, ‘containment’ became the buzz word in defense policy.  Controlling, 
or containing communism was the primary objective, and air base defense took a 
backseat to the prevention of or preparation for massive nuclear annihilation.  Security 
doctrine designed for safeguarding our nuclear stockpiles and associated facilities became 
the primary focus, and while vital combat equipment and nuclear-related critical 
infrastructure were well defended, preparation for the defense of peripheral infrastructure, 
still vital to the mission, remained undeveloped.   
In an effort to expedite the introduction of U.S. air assets into the Vietnam region, 
abandoned air bases, formerly used by the French regime during their occupation and 
located in densely populated areas, were resurrected and became primary U.S. airfields.  
Many dwelling areas, located adjacent to base perimeter fences laden with holes and 
excess vegetation, offered uncontrolled access points and tactical cover and concealment 
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for guerrillas moving about the area.  These population centers near the base also 
prohibited security personnel from deploying landmines, trip flares and other warning 
mechanisms outside the perimeter fence.  The expansion of several air bases also forced 
the relocation of numerous villagers that previously resided in those areas and who due to 
their religious customs, required repeated entry onto the air base for various familial or 
ceremonial rituals.  Security personnel, forced to escort these villagers and sweep for 
mines/bombs after their departure, were unavailable for normal security duties, further 
exposing infrastructure on base to ensuing enemy guerrilla attacks.151   
The rapid buildup of forces and assets in the region also saturated the few 
operational bases U.S. forces had occupied.  During the heaviest fighting, 76% of all 
coalition aircraft and 60% of U.S. aircraft flew sorties from these target-rich air bases.152  
Inadequate placement and protection of munitions and jet fuel, combined with the 
construction of major military headquarters units on these bases made them even more 
lucrative targets to the guerrillas operating in the region.  The improper siting of these 
resources ultimately forced the Air Force to dedicate additional security personnel to 
defend them, an asset already in short supply.153  Air Force security officials 
continuously demonstrated a genuine disinterest along with improper planning in the 
placement of critical infrastructure and other war fighting resources in a combat area.  
Alternate placement, with collaborative security and manpower considerations, could 
have simplified security operations and should have been executed.    
With air bases defended by indigenous forces early on in the Vietnam conflict, 
U.S. war fighting assets were often entrusted to host nation forces with limited oversight 
provided by U.S. military liaisons in the area.  Additionally, instead of focusing on the 
more relevant and pressing counterinsurgency doctrine to defend Vietnam air bases, Air 
Force security remained focused on the Soviet saboteur threat—concentrating on the 
interior portions of the air base while host nation forces patrolled the exterior.  The host 
nation relationship with the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), tumultuous at best, prevented 
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Air Force security personnel from properly defending their own critical war fighting 
aircraft, usually parked wingtip to wingtip and laden with war fighting munitions.  
Instead, this misguided security emphasis left them to focus on non-critical infrastructure 
and assets.  The VNAF exercised ownership rights and control over construction and 
placement of all new buildings, airfields and infrastructure on Vietnam air bases, often 
denying or delaying requests.  These delays and deviations from original security and 
logistical planning often caused U.S. forces to develop alternate and typically less secure 
plans.  
With little apparent thought given to their strategic placement, various critical 
infrastructures, vital to war fighting efforts, were sited in non-tactical locations and/or 
were often left unprotected.  Critical electric power plants and generators, used by 
command centers and for aircraft navigational aids, were often not assigned designated 
security personnel, and due to poor planning were typically located in close proximity to 
one another.  Additionally, munitions areas and fuel tanks/bladders were often located 
and stored on or adjacent to aircraft parking areas, causing the potential for explosive and 
cataclysmic problems for both personnel and aircraft.  Command posts, communication 
centers, aircraft maintenance and civil engineering control centers, all vital nodes in the 
war fighting effort, also lacked proper blast and fragmentation mitigation measures.  
Many key operating facilities and mass-gathering areas also lacked the proper shielding 
and roof structures required to withstand direct enemy rocket attacks.  Finally, critical 
recovery vehicles such as those used for fires and crash damage control were often left 
non-dispersed and unprotected in open areas.154  Continuous enemy attacks on 
unprotected critical infrastructure led some officials to believe something must be done. 
Despite several efforts to shore up physical security using hardened aircraft 
revetments/shelters, vegetation removal and much-needed perimeter lighting, the 81-mm 
mortar and recoilless rifle attacks of the enemy continued to wreak havoc on U.S. 
airfields and aircraft.  On April 13, 1966, Tan Son Nhut, a major operating base in the 
region and the only Air Force air base yet to be attacked, was struck by an enemy mortar  
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and rifle barrage.  Thirteen minutes and 245 rounds later, 62 aircraft were damaged or 
destroyed as well as the loss of 34 vehicles, a 420,000-gallon fuel tank and significant 
portions of the runway.155   
In total, repeated guerrilla attacks by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army 
on U.S. air bases led to the overall destruction of 1,269 U.S. and Vietnamese aircraft on 
the ground, more than were downed by enemy MiGs in air-to-air combat.156  The 
majority of these 475 air base attacks involved the enemy’s use of stand-off weapons 
from just outside the perimeter of the air base while Air/Security Police concentrated on 
less critical infrastructure located in the interior portions of the base.157  The highly 
disciplined VC/NVA had found a way to continuously exploit Air/Security Police 
security doctrine by striking safely from a distance and always at self-imposed locations 
and frequencies. 
Fast forward approximately 20 years and we find the Air Force Security Police 
fighting a similar kind of enemy in a different part of the world.  The tragic bombing of a 
military barracks at Khobar Towers, located near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, left 19 
servicemen and women dead and another 200 wounded from the enormous blast and 
exploding debris.  Despite selfless acts of professionalism and courage on the part of 
several Security Police members, numerous operational and planning deficiencies 
indicate military planners were unaware of the risks posed to U.S. service personnel 
serving in Saudi Arabia.  The brutal attack on Khobar Towers on June 25, 1996 “exposed 
the risks to U.S. military personnel deployed to foreign countries with various cultural 
sensitivities for contingency operations.”158   
The Khobar Towers complex, originally designed by Saudi developers to provide 
shelter to the local Bedouins, was offered up to the Americans by the Saudi government 
to provide housing and operational areas for military personnel involved in Operation 
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Southern Watch.  The location of the complex, deep in the middle of an urban 
environment and surrounded on all sides by residential and commercial facilities, posed 
operational security challenges regarding the placement of perimeter fencing and other 
physical barriers.   Security Police officials highlighted this potential vulnerability, yet 
the perimeter fence adjacent to the largest military barracks in the compound was a mere 
85 feet from the building.159  Yet another perimeter fence, delineating civilian and 
military housing areas ran directly down the middle of a four-lane highway. 
In response to the bombing of the Saudi Arabian National Guard building (killing 
five Americans) in Riyadh in 1995 and numerous reports of enemy surveillance or 
suspicious activity, several security enhancements were ordered for Khobar Towers.  
Concrete barriers were placed along the perimeter of the compound and guards were 
added to the rooftops of taller buildings.  Despite these and other modifications, the base 
leadership continued to focus on a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) 
entering the base through a primary installation entry point in a penetration style of 
attack.  Less emphasis was placed on a stand-off or other unconventional type of attack 
coming from outside the perimeter.   
Much like the experience in Vietnam, interaction and coordination with host 
nation forces was often a daunting and unsuccessful venture.  Requests to move the 
perimeter fence adjacent to the north end of the base and closest to one of the largest U.S. 
barracks met with Saudi resistance.  The Saudi government, renowned for bureaucratic 
delays, mismanaged processes and non-expeditious action, stated expansion of the fence 
would limit available parking for a nearby mosque and the stand-off distance was more 
than sufficient for a car bomb similar to the one used earlier in Riyadh.  Challenges arose 
regarding operational security matters and host nation security action/involvement.  The 
presence of U.S. military personnel tested the cultural and religious beliefs of many local 
residents.  With trees and other vegetation growing along the perimeter fence allowing 
enemy movements and surveillance, U.S. officials asked the Saudi government to cut it 
back.  Fearing an increased exposure of U.S. servicewomen wearing short pants and/or 
driving around the compound, the Saudi government refused the request.  In response, the 
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U.S. military asked for an increase in external Saudi patrols coupled with random 
inspections of vehicles outside the perimeter.  Once again, the Saudis were indifferent to 
this request. 
Several internal force protection recommendations and countermeasures 
regarding a potential stand-off attack were also overlooked.  Because both the Office of 
Special Investigation and Security Police threat and vulnerability assessments failed to 
identify the expansion of the perimeter fence, this measure was not pursued with the 
sense of urgency it should have received.  Similarly, while focusing on the threat of a car 
bomb penetration attack, the placement of Mylar on barracks’ windows and/or the 
relocation of military personnel housed closest to the perimeter fence were not the 
primary focus of enhancement efforts.   
After the dust settled, policy makers and defense planners in Washington 
demanded answers.  While it is undoubtedly easier to evaluate mistakes or policy 
implementation errors made after the fact, several committees were swiftly created to 
investigate potential mistakes and develop after-action reports.  The two pertinent reports 
associated with the Khobar incident were the Downing Report, a product of the Downing 
Assessment Task Force and the follow-up to that report, the Independent Review of the 
Khobar Towers Bombing, conducted by Lt Gen James Record.  Their recommendations 
associated with their list of findings were designed in the hopes of preventing atrocities 
such as Khobar from happening in the future.  In regards to critical infrastructure and its 
protection, both reports agreed on several findings regarding general and physical 
security.  First, critical military facilities should be located in secluded areas whenever 
possible and such structures should be physically hardened based on appropriate threats.  
Next, in regards to large-scale VBIED’s and other similar explosive attacks, stand-off 
distances and blast mitigation measures need to be considered and implemented 
whenever possible. The reports recommended using enhanced barriers to shield and 
protect specific critical infrastructure.  Finally, vulnerable facilities should be relocated to 
more secure, U.S. controlled environs whenever possible, and concrete barriers and other 
obstacles should be employed around vulnerable compounds and structures.160   
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As one steps back and examines the policy and procedural errors made during all 
three periods of time, it is apparent that adequate examination into the vulnerability of 
critical infrastructure and assets, particularly aircraft, fuel and munitions storage areas 
were not explored, particularly during the Vietnam conflict, leading to the loss of nearly 
1,300 aircraft and other valuable, war fighting equipment.161  Nor was the continued use 
of the military barracks at Khobar Towers, located dangerously close to the perimeter 
fence, a positive example of weighing all available information, including vulnerabilities 
and the known threats.  With the current and predicted expeditionary nature of the DOD, 
its assets and personnel will continue to be parceled to all corners of the globe.  As a 
result, funding and the requisite security assets deemed necessary for the protection of its 
critical infrastructure remain a HD/LD problem.162   
As Shlapak and Vick stipulate, our future adversaries are no match for our 
military superiority and thus would avoid large-scale conventional attacks on military 
installations and infrastructure.  Instead, our future enemies will undoubtedly continue to 
use asymmetrical and unconventional methods to attack high-value assets critical to 
USAF operations.163  Air Force Security Forces personnel must play a vital role in the 
defense of critical infrastructure and associated critical assets through both the Defense 
and Air Force Critical Infrastructure Programs. 
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROGRAM (DCIP) 
Certain infrastructure deemed critical to the defense of the nation, otherwise 
known as National Defense Infrastructure, such as missile sites, electrical generation 
plants and military air bases, could cause severe and/or permanent mission degradation if 
destroyed or incapacitated.  The Department of Defense must stand ready to rapidly 
identify and respond to potential threats to not only the nation’s infrastructure, but also 
infrastructure specific to DOD missions and functions.  Additionally, the DOD must 
stand ready to prevent or limit the overall effects of a terrorist attack and recover from 
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ideally limited numbers of threats or attacks.164  While denying our enemies any 
unforeseen advantages, protection of this infrastructure (both domestic and foreign, 
public and private) also allows for the planning, mobilizing, deploying, executing and 
sustaining of military operations around the world.   
During the Cold War, the U.S. military came to rely on and focus all energies on 
specific enemies through military or diplomatic measures.  This balance of power was 
able to keep most non-state actors in check for over 40 years.  Today, things are 
dramatically different.  Enemies of the U.S., the sole remaining hegemon, know better 
than to take on our military conventionally in some form of direct combat situation.  
Rather, through unconventional or asymmetric methods, they seek targets with high 
symbolic value or those which may garner massive media coverage.  As numerous 
researchers and theorists indicated in Chapter III, military resources (air bases and other 
assets) clearly have high symbolic value.  Destruction or disruption of these assets 
promotes tremendous support amongst the terrorists’ constituency, while perhaps 
simultaneously hurting the American public’s morale.  Successful attacks on these targets 
domestically may also distract war planners and policy makers from ongoing missions in 
the Middle East.165   
While complementing other DOD CI programs, the DCIP is designed to provide 
solutions for identified vulnerabilities within the defense industrial base.  This process 
will be accomplished using a familiar methodological approach of identifying, 
prioritizing and assessing defense critical infrastructure, while simultaneously developing 
plans and procedures to minimize any associated and potential risks.  Should an attack or 
event occur, and critical infrastructure within the sector is lost or degraded, the DOD 
must have procedures in place to restore capabilities and support consequence 
management.166   
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Because DOD assets and other military infrastructure remain such lucrative 
terrorist targets, effective implementation of DCIP is tremendously important.  However, 
in order to exploit the core capabilities of precision engagement and air/space superiority, 
prioritization of global air base assets remains critical not only to the success of DOD 
mission, but ultimately for the Air Force’s overall mission as well.  Yet, without a clearly 
defined and universally implemented methodology, Combatant Commands (COCOM) 
and individual service branches could end up going in several different directions.  
Fortunately, the Air Force CIP closely resembles that of the DCIP, with similar sectors 
and responsibilities.  Security Forces play a crucial role in the execution of the Air Force 
program, particularly as it relates to the air base defense mission.   
C. SECURITY FORCES’ ROLE IN THE AIR FORCE CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM (AF CIP) 
In developing its own CI program, the Air Force is called upon to identify and list 
particular infrastructure and assets deemed critical to not only the Air Force mission, but 
also the COCOMs and DOD missions as well.  Once these assets and associated 
vulnerabilities are assessed and identified, remediation and mitigation strategies must be 
devised and implemented to support the execution of the National Military Strategy 
(NMS).  Yet, the execution of the NMS contains elements of military, strategic and 
political risk made more prominent by the interconnectedness of its cyber and physical 
Defense Critical Assets (DCAs).  The dependencies and often overlapping functionalities 
of these assets, while often improving capabilities and overall mission effectiveness, 
similarly increase the Air Force’s risks and vulnerabilities to them, whether from human 
error, natural disasters, and/or intentional attacks.  When assets and capabilities are 
connected in some fashion, often the destruction or temporary reduction of one can carry 
negative or lingering implications on others.  Viewing the program more from an 
operational level, Air Force installations/air bases, MAJCOMs and COCOMs must 
understand these risks as they depend on various critical assets and infrastructures vital to 
their operational effectiveness and mission execution.   
Through the use of structured and somewhat scientific methodologies, the 
specifics of which are not intended for this research, the AF CIP attempts to determine its 
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mission essential tasks (METS.)167  The difficult and often somewhat subjective element 
of this process is then determining task critical assets (TCAs) and supporting 
infrastructure critical assets (SICAs) vital to the execution of each identified mission.  In 
generic terms, identified critical assets and infrastructures are assessed for their overall 
importance to and support of MAJCOM and COCOM missions and day-to-day 
operations of core business processes and functions.168  This process not only identifies 
those assets and infrastructures most vital to war fighting missions, but also provides the 
identified capability to apply scarce resources (i.e., funding and security manpower) to 
the most critical assets.   
Similar to the National and Defense Critical Infrastructure Plans, the Air Force 
CIP also developed specific Sector Leads (i.e., public works, health affairs, logistics and 
personnel) to develop and maintain relationships with other government and civil 
agencies, as well as the private sector, to address critical infrastructure issues and 
concerns.  Each Sector Lead is responsible for evaluating their individual sectors, using 
both existing DOD and AF doctrine, to determine whether they adequately address the 
measures called for by the AF CIP.  Ideally, this process should identify risks and 
vulnerabilities to AF infrastructure within each sector, as well as generate potential tools 
to help prevent or mitigate them.   
Creating and exploring methodologies to determine an asset’s overall importance 
is meaningless if you don’t also follow up your findings with various actions.  
Undoubtedly, one must identify measures to mitigate identified threats, establish 
redundant or back-up assets/infrastructure, and document all this information in some 
type of data management system for COCOM and MAJCOM situational awareness.  
Currently, vulnerability/risk assessment and pertinent infrastructure data is input into 
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several DOD data systems, such as the Air Force’s Critical Assets Management System 
(AF CAMS).  This and other systems allow operational forces and other key players to 
view crucial data, near real-time, ultimately assisting in timely and more efficient mission 
execution.   
CIP, whether at the National, DOD or Air Force level, is a long-term program, 
requiring constant attention to changing threats and situations.  CIP demands specificity 
in identification of these threats and vulnerabilities as well as the protective measures 
selected to counter them.  More importantly, CIP requires commitment, from individual 
Security Forces members, to program managers and senior leaders.  We cannot afford to 
make the same mistakes we have made in the past.   
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The nature of terrorist threats is changing rapidly and will continue to do so for 
the foreseeable future.  The combination of rapidly changing technologies, weaponry and 
networked organizational styles used by these terror groups creates a volatile situation in 
which the nature of threats and vulnerabilities may be difficult to assess and even more 
difficult to predict.  If the AF CIP is to be successful, several recommendations should be 
followed: 
1. As directed by AFPD 10-24, it is imperative CIP education and training is 
inserted into all appropriate command and base level courses in addition to senior 
staff and senior enlisted professional military education.169  If Air Force leaders 
in policy/decision making positions understand the importance of the program 
and appreciate its utility, they will undoubtedly be inclined to promote the 
program to junior officers and enlisted members, feeding a much-needed and 
developing constituency.  By incorporating CIP into training exercises, it will 
help develop an appreciation and awareness of the overall impact of losing 
various critical assets destroyed or incapacitated through the exploitation of 
existing or undiscovered vulnerabilities.   
2. Incorporation of CIP into MAJCOM and installation-level training exercises.  All 
the guidelines and policies drafted on paper mean nothing if you cannot execute 
them in reality.  Contingency response exercises (terrorist attacks, MARE, 
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natural disasters, etc.) are an excellent tool to determine the responsiveness and 
overall readiness of each responding agency or organization.170  It is further 
recommended that installations with critical resources and infrastructure 
detached from the installation (i.e., JP-8 fuel lines coming from off base), 
practice joint response scenarios with off-base partners such as local fire and 
police departments.  The time to exchange business cards is not after a major 
catastrophe.   
3. Support the establishment of mechanisms for sanitizing and disseminating data 
on critical infrastructures such as their associated vulnerabilities, threats and 
risks.  With data management systems such as AF CAMS, COCOM and 
MAJCOM commanders will gain near real-time situational awareness required 
for combat effectiveness and readiness.  It is imperative critical asset findings 
and associated information be input correctly and regularly to support the war 
fighting effort.  Additionally, security issues and lessons learned should be 
shared (as appropriate) with portions of the private sector.  Sharing (as well as 
obtaining) best practices and other innovative security measures will undoubtedly 
benefit all participants. 
4.  The creation and incorporation of “Red Cell” teams.  Red Cell teams provide a 
mostly impartial view and method of discovering and dealing with infrastructure 
vulnerabilities and incidents.  Installations can employ these teams as a method 
of identifying potential new threats and vulnerabilities perhaps overlooked by 
sentries or other workers who may have developed a level of complacency from 
working in/around a particular infrastructure for too long.  
5. Encourage total base awareness and owner user involvement.  With manpower 
shortages projected in the Security Forces career field due to the high operations 
tempo, security resources on Air Force installations may be stretched thin.  
Augmentation programs such as Resource Augmentation Duty (READY) and 
Security Force Manning Assistance are only temporary gap fillers and often 
complicate matters by pulling resources away from other areas around the 
installation, often equally desperate for manpower.  Through base awareness 
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programs, coupled with selective arming programs, installation commanders can 
effectively augment Security Forces by forcing owner-user involvement.  Not 
every critical asset or infrastructure warrants the same level of protection, and 
Security Forces cannot be everywhere at once.  Owner-user programs would 
allow for augmented sentries, perhaps more familiar with the associated 
infrastructure, to participate in securing it, even if only in times of elevated 
threats. 
6. While each installation commander may argue for additional funding or 
manpower requirements for resources or infrastructure they deem critical, it may 
not be critical in terms of the overall Air Force, and ultimately, DOD mission set.  
Computer data programs such as the Vulnerability Assessment Management 
Program (VAMP) and the Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program 
(CVAMP) must be managed properly to identify where the most critical AF 
infrastructure is located and track various deficiencies and vulnerabilities through 
closure.   
7. As future enemies will undoubtedly operate in an asymmetric manner in 
employing potential attacks on air bases and military installations, security 
planners also need to think in an asymmetric fashion to protect their most critical 
infrastructures from attack.  Given the limited resources available for facility 
upgrades, force protection enhancements and other physical security projects, 
focus must be directed towards the most critical infrastructures on any given 
installation.  Planners should reconsider preconceived notions of why/how 
various resources are deemed critical, and continually explore how/if various 
critical infrastructure are interconnected.  The interconnectivity of various 
infrastructures may make analogous resources more vulnerable than those 
outlying resources perhaps deemed more critical in previous assessments.  
During operational planning, a small amount of effort can ultimately lead to a 
large amount of security if planners examine non-obvious methods of 
strengthening their critical nodes. 
8. Security Forces leadership must stay engaged in Force Protection Working 
Groups, Threat Working Groups and other force protection advisory and 
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planning venues for determining, assessing and prioritizing base resources, 
particularly in determining appropriate levels of protection once a list is 
developed.  Additionally, if SF leadership maintains a working knowledge of 
current and projected base critical infrastructure, they will be better prepared to 
establish an appropriate security posture to defend it. 
Often times, the implementation of effective intelligence sharing and/or critical 
infrastructure protection plans would not be possible if it were not for various force 
protection-enhancing technologies and equipment.  As it has been described throughout 
this work, one of the primary reasons enemy attacks on air bases were successful in the 
past was the lack or inadequate quality of technology available to security personnel.  
Troops on the ground often sought improved weapons, vehicles, sensors, remote and 
handheld detection equipment, yet were often disappointed by the slow or nonexistent 
delivery of said items.  Chapter VI will examine many of these earlier failures, describing 
how various force protection equipment fell far short of expectations and often left troops 
on the ground with nothing more than expensive paper weights.  This chapter will also 
describe some of the current and future air base defense technologies/programs and 
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VI. TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION AND BASE DEFENSE 
The Department of Defense faces numerous competing priorities and 
operational demands.  However, the committee notes that without a stable 
long-term investment in basic research and technology development, the 
recent display of the armed forces’ technological advantages, such as 
precision weaponry, unmanned systems, smart munitions and increased 
situational awareness, would not have been possible.  
Senate Armed Services Committee, May 13, 2003.171 
Throughout history, the military has evolved strategically and doctrinally, and 
perhaps even organizationally, because of continued advances in technology.  From 
muskets to machine guns, strategic bombing runs to precision-guided missiles, history is 
filled with examples of where a new weapon, improved airframe or enhanced 
communication system have provided those who possess them some form of advantage 
on the battlefield.  Ever since Western armies first attempted to counter German machine 
guns with their Mark I tanks, it has depended almost entirely on its technological 
advances to keep pace with the evolution of war.  A continued emphasis on technology 
appears to be the trend and the basis for prescribing how DOD, and ultimately Security 
Forces, will operate in the near future and beyond.   
Technology can, and often does, benefit the force protection mission.  As the Air 
Force moves forward with new Integrated Base Defense security systems, the structural 
and procedural integration of this technology will be critical to executing the IBD 
mission.  This chapter will examine prior cases where possessing inadequate equipment 
and/or failing to obtain various technologies negatively affected the air base defense 
mission.  It will also examine numerous future and current technologies and programs 
vital to the effective implementation of the IBD mission.  Finally, this chapter provides 
recommendations for air base planners regarding the use and employment of various 
technologies and associated doctrine.  
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A. EARLY MISUSE OR LACK OF TECHNOLOGY AFFECTING AIR BASE 
DEFENSE 
During the Vietnam War, the United States possessed several computerized 
models and other quantitative indicators used for analyzing the progress of the war from 
Washington, D.C.  Yet, as war planners seated comfortably in their Washington offices 
became enamored by this computerization and quantitative analysis, they tended to 
overlook the more delicate aspects of where the enemy was truly winning.  Security 
personnel in Vietnam relied upon a mixture of tactical support equipment, including 
various sensors and locating devices in their air base defense mission.  Unfortunately, as 
the stand-off attacks escalated at air bases throughout the region, these electronic and 
mechanical aids were often rushed into service, many of which were untested and 
inadequate.  Despite the first-ever use of countermortar radar devices at various 
installations, these surveillance radars had radial scan limitations, usually only covering 
approximately 40 degrees (out of 360) within a particular sector.172  Because of these 
limitations, these devices were often purposely aimed directly at areas deemed most 
likely as high speed avenues of approach for an enemy attack.  These countermortar 
radars were also mostly ineffective against rockets, allowing for enemy troop movements 
to launch numerous rockets simultaneously with limited detection capability.  Similarly, 
Da Nang air base paid the price for this limited capability, as insurgents fired 64 rockets 
onto that air base (and a nearby village) in less than 60 seconds.173 
Based on an increasing need to detect enemy personnel and vehicle intrusions 
along base perimeters, the South East Asia Intrusion Detection Equipment Program was 
started.  This program was designed to field test a wide variety of intrusion detection 
equipment, hastened for battlefield use by skipping normal production line issues and 
other standard testing procedures.  This “buy and try” approach was extremely 
unorthodox and often led to fielding and operational problems.174  In another case of an 
expedited research and development period, approximately 40 specialized rifle sights, 
designed by Sears Roebuck Company to enhance nighttime shooting were also rushed to 
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the battle zone.  With limited instructions and unorganized fielding, these sights were 
ultimately a bust.  Another failed system, the Surveillance and Detection System (SADS 
1.5) required a buried seismic sensor line in and around the areas security personnel 
sought to defend.  This system was eventually rejected due to its overall cost and inability 
to produce sound results in varied climates.175   
Probably the most complex, yet promising system tested during this period was 
the Perimeter Detection and Surveillance Subsystem (PDSS.)  This system utilized two 
types of antipersonnel radar and a radio data mechanism allowing for the transmission of 
triggered alarm data to a fixed receiver panel.  This system actually showed early 
promise, but produced inadequate, unreliable data during inclement weather, with 
moisture and leakage causing malfunctions within the system.176  The PDSS, initially 
thought to generate a manpower savings, actually mandated additional manpower as it 
typically required numerous sentries to protect the system from VC/NVA units looking to 
dig up the sensor lines.177  Air Force security leadership recognized a limited benefit in 
placing sensor devices outside and away from the base perimeter, yet also realized these 
sensors were not meant to actually replace security personnel as detection instruments on 
the base perimeter.  Realizing the equipment’s limitations, they understood these sensors 
represented nothing more than an “extension of the sensory capabilities of the sentry,” 
and the “use of these sensors should be governed until much more sophisticated devices 
are developed.”178   
One of the key elements to executing the air base defense mission is reliable 
communications.  Yet, communication equipment in Vietnam often proved to be 
inadequate to provide tactical communications for patrolling units and base defense 
operations centers.  Base defenders relied upon 2-channel Motorola radios transmitting 
from over 300 different locations.179  As the VC/NVA developed radio jamming 
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capabilities, the radios and the over saturated networks used by U.S. personnel during the 
Vietnam conflict proved to be non-tactical and clearly inadequate for use in an insurgent 
environment.   
Vehicles used by Security Police mobile patrols were often less than satisfactory.  
Police units were often called upon to respond to portions of the installation unreachable 
on foot.  This required various vehicle platforms, including the M-151 (resembles the 
old-style Jeep).180  The M-151 did not provide the necessary levels of armored protection 
for responding police units, degrading the response capability of this vehicle.  Similarly, 
Security Police units experienced difficulties with the armored personnel carriers (APC) 
provided to them for a more protected/hardened response.  These vehicles were 
advertised as being capable of operating through any kind of weather and on any type of 
terrain.  Security Police units at Vietnam air bases soon learned this was not the case.  
The APC’s were extremely heavy, causing them to bog down in wet sand or mud.  This 
made them extremely unreliable in an area certainly not lacking in its annual 
precipitation. 
During combat operations in Vietnam, the one piece of equipment a base defender 
came to rely on implicitly was his/her weapon.  Yet, despite its impressive features, the 
standard-issue Colt AR15, M-16 rifle often demonstrated the ability to misfire or seize up 
due to the muck and dust that would often collect in the weapon’s gas tubes and chamber.  
During the Vietnam industrial push, bullet manufacturers issued a new form of 
gunpowder that often left chunks of calcium carbonate in the weapon’s gas tube.  These 
environmental and man-made elements, along with an insufficient spring-loading 
mechanism, often caused the weapons to jam during intense fighting.  Additionally, if the 
weapons were loaded with 30-round magazines the M-16 would routinely seize up.  After 
experiencing this technical malfunction far too often, occasionally resulting in a fatal 
error, Air/Security Police on the ground learned to load their magazines with 27 
rounds.181 
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While some tactical support equipment, such as the starlight rifle scope and 
various other night vision observation devices, actually performed adequately by partially 
illuminating enemy ground forces, most items were either impractical, too costly or failed 
during field testing.  In examining the technologies available or implemented during 
Vietnam, it was clear once again that the Air Force was completely unprepared to execute 
its underdeveloped and mostly untested air base defense mission.   
An examination of available data related to the Khobar Towers bombing indicated 
a lack of emphasis on improved and integrated technologies to enhance the force 
protection posture there, despite an increase in terrorist activities and threat messages in 
the region.  In his after action report, retired General Downing and his commission 
concluded that the DOD needs more money, more people, better intelligence and 
advanced technology for the force protection mission.182  The report also stated using 
advanced technology can help protect U.S. forces, particularly in forward- deployed 
areas.  Downing’s task force found “a manpower-intensive approach to force protection 
that included sentries armed only with binoculars and their weapons on 12-hour shifts in 
120-degree-plus heat, bomb dogs with an effectiveness of 15-30 minutes on guard at 
gates, crude highway traffic control devices used as blast protection barriers.” 183    
Downing went on to say, during a Pentagon news briefing, that “We can and we must 
provide our forces with state-of-the-art sensors, blast protectors, automated entry points 
and cargo inspection devices.  We have enough inspectors out there.  We have enough 
people going out and telling commanders what is wrong.  We need people to go out and 
help, to point out deficiencies and then remain and make corrections and help 
commanders overseas install these advanced systems.”184 
While several of the general findings from Downing’s Khobar Towers 
Assessment remain classified, others pertaining to technology were cited in the version 
released to the public.  Coming as no surprise, Finding #17 cited U.S. forces and facilities 
in Saudi Arabia and the region were vulnerable to attack.  In addressing the physical 
security aspect of this finding, Downing’s group recommended employing improved and 
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integrated technology into the force protection mission.  They recommended intrusion 
detection systems, ground sensors, closed circuit television, day and night surveillance 
cameras, thermal imaging, perimeter lighting and advanced communications equipment 
to enhance the security posture for all air bases in the region.  Based on the repeated 
occurrences of explosive-related incidents in the region, the commission also 
recommended the employment of technology-based explosive detection and 
countermeasure devices.185  Finding #25 from the Downing Report stated technology 
was not widely used to detect, delay, mitigate and respond to acts of terrorism.  The 
commission recommended generic methods for incorporating technology and technical 
assistance to those in the field who required it.186  The Record Report concurred with 
Downing’s findings, but stated that the Air Staff should direct Air Force unit deployment 
managers to review their operational capabilities and ultimate requirements when it 
comes to the inclusion of high-tech equipment on future deployments.  The report also 
recommended training military leaders on an integrated systems approach for 
incorporating physical security and force protection technologies.187   
Terrorism experts mostly agree that there is no silver bullet for stopping all forms 
of terrorism.  The most dedicated, structured and well-financed terrorist groups will 
undoubtedly find ways to outmaneuver or outwit various forms of sensing and detecting-
type equipment and technologies.  Yet today, ion scanners, biometric identification cards 
and cargo crate X-ray devices detect and undoubtedly deter potential terrorists from 
carrying out their often-deadly acts.  However, as history has demonstrated, the absence 
or ineffective use of force protection technologies contributed to the success of repeated 
insurgent stand-off attacks and perimeter penetrations in Vietnam and one catastrophic 
event at Khobar Towers.  After-action reports and case studies from both periods 
determined the availability and ultimate utilization of improved technologies may have 
prevented some or most of these attacks from occurring.   
More recently, it has become evident that increased weapon and information 
technologies will allow enemy forces to attack air bases often used for the forward 
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deployment of our land-based forces.  So, as the Air Force moves forward with its IBD 
mission, expanding the battlespace and seeking to see, understand and act upon these 
enemy weapons and technologies first, there will be a tremendous emphasis placed on 
elaborate and expensive intrusion and detection systems and their appropriate 
implementation.  A continued emphasis on technology appears to be the trend and the 
basis for prescribing how DOD will operate in the near future and beyond.  As the Air 
Force moves forward with improved equipment and new camera, detection and warning 
security systems, the structural and procedural integration of this technology is critical to 
executing the IBD mission.   
B. BETTER THAN BEFORE: CURRENT AND FUTURE AIR BASE 
DEFENSE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 
Security Forces personnel, particularly those patrolling the perimeter and 
controlling the intrusion detection systems, are crucial in the development and 
enforcement of the new IBD doctrine.  Yet security sentries can also occasionally be the 
weakest link in the process and the primary reason why security fails.  Arguably, Security 
Forces personnel remain the most disciplined career field in the Air Force, yet they still 
experience those rare occurrences involving patrols or entry controllers being inattentive 
or simply not focusing on their primary task at hand.  Consequently, every security 
system must have trusted, trained and mission-focused personnel to function properly.  
There are those who feel advances in technological systems will ultimately replace 
people, thereby eliminating the ‘human nature’ factor, the apparent cause of some system 
failures.  However, unlike computers, ground surveillance radar systems and other rigid 
forms of technology, people are creative, ingenious and often quite flexible.  The most 
effective security equipment and/or systems should be designed to maximize the 
creativity and flexibility humans provide while simultaneously reduce their inherent 
limitations.  While many software programs and new-age munitions are developed to 
adapt to environmental and other mission changes, only people can truly alter their 
response pattern as an enemy attack develops. 
It is quite beyond the scope of this chapter to examine all future or recently 
fielded military technologies, their implementation and associated doctrine and strategy.  
Yet as threats to U.S. air bases and military infrastructure from insurgent stand-off, IED 
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and other explosive attacks remains a strong possibility, the U.S. military continues its 
technological transformation, to acquire new and improved technologies in an effort to 
subjugate this postulated threat.188   
The days of placing security personnel in foxholes or entrenched positions in 
forward areas of the air bases they are defending (listening post/observation post (LP/OP) 
are seemingly behind us.  While the IBD template still calls for detection and assessment 
of the enemy as far from the air base as possible, this task will now be accomplished 
primarily through detection and sensing technologies.  Replacing security sentries in 
guard towers along the perimeter are the ground based surveillance radars and motion-
tracking cameras.  Flight line access gates, often manned by security personnel in the 
past, can and will be operated from a central location while also functioning through 
biometric and other personal recognition technologies.  As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, air base defenders of the past often lacked up-to-date or appropriate weaponry 
and optical/sensing equipment for their base defense mission.  Weapons, detection 
equipment and personal gear continue to evolve and offer enhanced capabilities in 
thwarting potential air base attackers. 
The standard-issue Colt M-16 rifle, used by U.S. war fighters since 1963, has only 
recently been replaced by a shorter and lighter M-4 version.  The M-4 comes with an 
optional forward handgrip, advanced opticals and is ideal for short-range combat.  
Additionally, weapons currently in development and scheduled for deployment as soon as 
2009 include the Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW), a 12-pound, high-
explosive grenade firing workhorse and the Objective Crew Served Weapon (OCSW), a 
replacement for the esteemed 50-caliber machine gun.  Using a two-person crew, the 
OCSW uses a laser rangefinder for directing 25mm rounds out to distances as far out as 
2,000 meters at a rate up to 260 rounds per minute.189 
With many forward-deployed locations involved in humanitarian or peacekeeping 
missions and most stateside air bases remaining in close proximity to civilian 
populations, the military often finds itself operating around and adjacent to large groups 
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of civilians.  This environment, particularly in forward-deployed locations, carries the 
potential for a negative set of cascading circumstances.  The U.S. military is currently 
researching and developing a variety of non-lethal weapons for situations that do not 
warrant lethal force, yet require more than a string of harsh words.  Many of these 
weapons are still in the blueprint or prototype phase, yet several are worth mentioning for 
their potential utility in the air base defense role.  One form of what is called active denial 
technology is a HMMWV-mounted weapon that emits a directed electromagnetic energy 
beam that passes through the enemy’s clothing and penetrates his skin a fraction of an 
inch, causing temporary, yet intense heat.  The U.S. Marine Corps is currently funding 
this program and anticipates its potential application as early as 2009.190  Several other 
incapacitating-type weapons in development include: electrical shock devices, laser and 
acoustic directed energy weapons.  The focused, high-power noise caused by an acoustic 
weapon can incapacitate humans from within the stand-off range.  So, whether it is a 
laser beam used to temporarily blind the enemy, or electrical shock weapons used to 
cause immediate and uncontrollable muscle contraction in insurgent attackers, these less-
than-lethal weapons certainly possess some utility in protest, peacekeeping and 
humanitarian type missions.  However, they may also be utilized in forward-friendly or 
stateside urban areas in the IBD role. 
For nighttime combat and air base perimeter observation, security personnel are 
now equipped with night vision goggles such as the AN/PVS-7.  These goggles have two 
eyepieces but a single lens illuminates the ground in front of the wearer, requiring very 
little ambient light to do so.  With the ability to mount this item on a Kevlar helmet, make 
adjustments with one hand and incorporate a compass and infrared spotlight lens, these 
goggles offer many advantages Air Force security personnel in Korea, Vietnam and 
Khobar Towers did not have or were late in receiving.   
Other forms of handheld or mobile detection equipment include thermal infrared 
sensors, ground surveillance radar units, laser range finders, target designators and a 
radar flashlight.  Thermal infrared sensors detect heat emitted by humans and combustion 
engines at considerable distances.  While they do not typically fare well in precipitation 
                                                 
190 Vizard and Scott, 116.  HMMWV is a Highly Mobile Multi-Wheeled Vehicle, often referred to as 
a “Humvee”.   
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or dense fog, they can see through obscurants and operate during the daytime.  Handheld 
ground surveillance radar units emit short bursts of electromagnetic energy to detect 
motion on the battlefield or areas outside air base perimeters.  These units are said to be 
capable of detecting enemy personnel hiding behind cement walls.191  Laser rangefinders, 
capable of being placed on individual weapons, use invisible lasers to determine the 
range from an approaching vehicle or troop formation using GPS technology.  When 
mounted on direct-fire weapons, shooters can incorporate infrared sensing goggles for 
extreme firing accuracy.  Finally, the radar flashlight uses microwave radar with an 
internal digital processor to detect the smallest of human movements (such as a person’s 
heartbeat or breathing rhythm).  This item is so sensitive, it is said to be able to detect 
human respiration through walls and dense foliage.192   
While some of these items are still in development, many others continue to crop 
up with promises to “detect this” and “track that.”  History has shown that more 
technology is not necessarily better; however, the right technology for the mission can be 
worth its weight in gold.  Now that we have examined several portable technologies 
suitable for base defense, all of which are upgrades from previous periods, the focus will 
now shift to technological security systems that are currently being utilized at Air Force 
bases around the world. 
C. SECURITY FORCES’ ROLE IN EXISTING BASE DEFENSE SYSTEMS 
AND TECHNOLOGY 
An examination of the air base defense doctrine implementation and execution 
from Korea up until the attack at Khobar indicates the force protection mission was often 
given a low priority.  Consequently, considering the DOD fiscal system is typically 
driven by requirements and priorities, the Air Force force protection, and specifically the 
air base defense mission, also generally received a lack of appropriate funding.  This lack 
of funding resulted in inadequate or missing technologies mentioned in the previous 
section.  
As Downing and Record have indicated in their investigative findings from the 
Khobar incident, had there been additional motion, or other forms of detection, sensors                                                  
191 Poole, H. John.  Phantom Soldier: The Enemy’s Answer to U.S. Firepower (North Carolina: 
Posterity Press, 2001), 209-212. 
192 Ibid., 209-212. 
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placed around Khobar’s perimeter, the terrorist bombers may have been discovered 
earlier and perhaps even apprehended.  After the Khobar tragedy, force protection 
became a huge priority.  In the year following the Khobar attack, the Air Force procured 
a contract with TRW for the deployment of the Tactical Automated Security System 
(TASS), an intrusion detection system specifically designed for placement around air 
base perimeters. The TASS system, “utilizing state-of-the-art technologies, operated on a 
variety of detection/sensor platforms, from microwave and magnetic, passive and active 
infrared to plain old fashioned trip wires.”193      
While TASS was certainly an improvement over the pre-Khobar situation, it also 
had its limitations.  TASS sensors could not pinpoint an enemy’s exact location within a 
detection zone and were often prone to nuisance alarms from blowing debris, wildlife or 
unmanaged foliage.  After several nuisance alarms in one particular zone or from one 
particular sensor, a Security Police controller could become complacent and simply 
‘acknowledge’ future alarms without dispatching a patrol to investigate further.  Or, a 
Security Police patrol, if dispatched numerous times to the same location, may make a 
command decision that the alarm is once again a nuisance and simply not respond.  Both 
situations represent the ‘human nature’ factor mentioned previously.  To avoid these and 
other complications, the Air Force conceptualized the development of an integrated 
security system whereby Security Forces controllers (ideally working out of consolidated 
first responder Emergency Dispatch Center) would receive a common operating picture 
for all air base alarms, cameras, and detection and warning sensors and systems. 
As a result of intense planning, research and development, the Air Force recently 
put in motion their Integrated Base Defense Security Systems (IBDSS) contract, designed 
to upgrade existing TASS capabilities and develop electronic detection, alarm 
assessment, access control and enhanced communications within a single system.  Due to 
immense program costs, this new system, named Pathfinder, is currently only being 
designed and installed at a handful of air bases.  Andrews Air Force Base, located just 
outside of Washington, D.C. and the home of Air Force One, was selected in September, 
                                                 
193 Cheryl Gerber. 2003. Lead Ahead for Force Protection. Military Information Technology: Online 
Edition.  Available at: http://www.military-information-technology.com/print_article.cfm?DocID=232 
(accessed on 19 August 2006). 
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2002, as the first Air Force base to field the Pathfinder system.194  This elaborate system, 
designed to enhance the overall effectiveness and performance of the security system at 
Andrews AFB, was developed using both transformational (leap-ahead) and off-the-shelf 
technologies.195  Capabilities of the system include: multi-layered area intrusion 
detection, tracking and reporting, access control, alarm day/night assessment, integrated 
6-screen Command and Control Display (CCD) and delay/denial capabilities.  Early 
detection and delay capabilities were designed around long and short infrared cameras, 
pan/tilt/zoom (PTZ) and fixed cameras, long and short range ground-based radar and 
Object-Video (smart video) detection software.196  Access control to and through 
sensitive areas is maintained by numerous automated vehicle gates and pedestrian 
turnstiles, both requiring access cards and 4-digit PIN numbers for entry.  Through the 
use of much of this transformational technology, the system will provide not only early 
detection and situational awareness (well beyond the air base perimeter), but the ability to 
monitor and track enemy penetrations through both camera and radar systems.  Early 
detection of potential adversaries in locations outside the air base perimeter (similar to 
those areas in which stand-off and explosive-related attacks were conducted in Korea, 
Vietnam and Khobar Towers) provide Security Forces the capability to achieve local and 
area dominance of their battlespace in support of force protection.197 
Since the Pathfinder system was designed specifically to augment the Integrated 
Base Defense mission, the system is primarily operated and maintained by Security 
Forces members.  In regards to the circulation control requirements for the system, 
Security Forces are responsible for determining security clearance requirements, 
delegating entry authority and the issuance of restricted area badges to authorized                                                  
194 In an effort to determine overall costs, risks and evaluate the performance of a fully integrated 
security system, Andrews AFB was selected to receive the first large-scale Pathfinder security system.  
Several other bases are receiving smaller versions, typically only including immediate flight line areas.  
Andrews’ design will include the entire Industrial Complex/flight line area with designs for SmartGate and 
installation entry control tie-ins programmed for out years. 
195 The scope of this chapter is not intended to describe every nuance of the Pathfinder system, rather 
to provide a generic description of some of its detection and assessment capabilities and several general 
Security Forces-related functions..   
196 Object Video Early Warning software monitors numerous video feeds for unusual or suspicious 
behavior.  Any movement not defined by the program’s pre-established parameters will be brought to the 
attention of the Security Forces Pathfinder Operator (i.e., an individual walking out of some nearby woods 
or too closely to a plane parked on the flight line).  
197 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, 3-10.1, 1. 
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personnel.  The Pathfinder system operator is responsible for: monitoring events at 
numerous automated crash-rated entry control points and pedestrian gates, including 
authentication attempts, lockouts, flight line gate operations and duress alarms.  
Additionally, the operator will monitor the 6-screen CCD, track and report all alarm 
activations, dispatch appropriate security patrols and up channel incidents involving 
priority resources.  Security Forces patrols, in addition to proactively patrolling the air 
base and responding to complaints and calls for service, will respond to and assess 
Pathfinder alarm activations and take appropriate action if required.  Improved 
surveillance of high-speed avenues of approach to and around the air base as well as 
improved perimeter and flight line sensors are critical so Security Forces personnel can 
quickly detect and defeat penetration attempts.  Other technologies such as in-dash police 
video, friendly force tracking and state-of-the-art communications systems are also 
crucial to augment the overall effectiveness of responding security units.   
Mostly due to the VBIED threat and its potential impact to air base missions, 
most, if not all, Air Force bases now have a separate vehicle entry gate, usually situated 
in a remote portion of the air base, used exclusively for commercial vehicle entry.  
Several methods for searching commercial vehicles exist and are used by Security Forces 
personnel.  The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) developed a Vehicle Entry 
Explosive Search Strategy (VEESS) that most vehicle inspectors reference and often 
carry in the cargo pockets of their uniforms.198  In addition to this useful booklet and the 
thorough hand searches conducted by dedicated security personnel, several different 
smaller-sized devices are commonly utilized at commercial search gates for examining 
areas search personnel either cannot explore or could potentially contain explosive 
material or contraband.  Many Air Force bases utilize Ion Scanners or VaporTracer 
devices for detecting swabbed or vapor samples for traces of explosives and/or 
contraband.199  Ion Scanners are typically desktop units requiring a dedicated, climate-
controlled workspace, and VaporTracers are handheld, portable units.  With proper and  
 
                                                 
198 TSWG is a D.C.-based group, established in 1986, that identifies and prioritizes research and 
development requirements for combating terrorism technologies for the purpose of national security.  
199 VaporTracer is a patented creation of the General Electric Corporation.  
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regular training, these devices can be extremely beneficial to the commercial search gate 
as well as for preventing the introduction of explosives and other contraband from 
entering the air base. 
Several Air Force bases have procured large-sized detection devices for bulk 
explosive detection at their commercial search gates.  One of the newer technologies 
being used today is the Idaho Explosives Detection System (IEDS).  Utilizing a state-of-
the-art neutron generator along with complex gamma-ray neutron activation analysis 
systems, these systems are capable of detecting a number of explosive and chemical 
warfare agents.  While this system typically requires a remote operating location, 
moderate shielding materials and intense operator training, this system is attacking the 
threat head-on and producing excellent results.200   
Another example of a larger-sized technology being utilized at search gates and 
other areas of the air base is the Mobile Search Vehicle (MSV) manufactured by 
American Science and Engineering (AS&E).  This piece of equipment (not considered 
part of the normal vehicle fleet) generates two types of X-Rays (transmission and a 
patented Z-backscatter) to process and analyze vehicles of all sizes.  As the MSV slowly 
passes by the target vehicle, it processes an image, similar to that of a normal airport x-
ray, for the MSV operator to examine and analyze.  Narcotics, explosives and other items 
can be easily identified on one of several large monitors located inside the MSV control 
room.  The MSV requires a 3-person crew and an almost perfectly flat surface to operate, 
but can locate metallic and organic items located in hidden compartments, in the 
undercarriage of vehicles or other places not visible to the naked eye.   
Security Forces personnel supporting the IBD mission have recently begun 
conducting airborne surveillance utilizing their Force Protection Airborne Surveillance 
System (FPASS).  The primary FPASS vehicle, aptly named Desert Hawk by current Air 
Force Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley, is small, lightweight and easy to operate.  
The Desert Hawk is a miniature UAV capable of flying pre-programmed missions for up 
to an hour on a single battery charge.  The flight plan of the Desert Hawk can also be 
                                                 
200 Ernesto Cespedes.  2005. Explosive Detection and Testing.  Idaho National Laboratory website.  
Available at: 
http://www.inl.gov/nationalsecurity/factsheets/docs/explosives_testing.pdf#search=%22remote%20explosi
ve%20detection%20system%22 (accessed on 22 August 2006). 
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altered mid-flight with a few simple keystrokes on the system’s laptop computer.  FPASS 
was designed specifically for Security Forces personnel to operate within close proximity 
of its assigned air base, providing real-time visual assessment of the surface-to-air missile 
footprint.201  Unmanned aerial vehicles such as the Desert Hawk do have some 
limitations however.  They cannot simultaneously monitor every square foot of the 
battlefield or areas adjacent to the air base perimeter.  They also typically cannot 
penetrate triple canopy vegetation; detect enemy movement below ground, beneath dense 
foliage or inside buildings.  Additionally, legal limitations prevent the use of such items 
over civilian populations, allowing for future foes to potentially operate near U.S. 
controlled areas undetected by this form of surveillance.  Yet, this crucial surveillance 
tool, equipped with thermal and night vision cameras, extends the range Security Forces 
personnel can monitor outside and away from air base perimeters without jeopardizing 
the forces or placing them in harms way.  FPASS is primarily utilized at forward-
deployed air bases such as Tallil Air Base in Iraq.  Here, the Desert Hawk interdicts 
enemy avenues of approach, weapons caches and anti-aircraft weaponry outside the air 
base perimeter, playing a vital role in the overall IBD mission. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In examining military history, one finds that as war fighting methodologies 
evolved, new technological developments or innovative tactical approaches evolved right 
along with them.  As technologies develop to counter the often unpredictable and 
seemingly ever-present threat of terrorism, they must focus on the critical areas of 
detection, networked communications, targeting/assessment and deterrence to benefit the 
air base defense mission.  The following basic recommendations apply to Security Forces 
members utilizing various technologies in the performance and execution of the IBD 
doctrine: 
1. Upon the acquisition of new technological gear or actual systems, it 
 is imperative that those using the equipment/systems receive proper 
 training, either from the manufacturer of the equipment or the procurement 
 agency (such as Electronic Systems Center/ESC).  Recurring training 
                                                 
201 John Pike. 2005.  Desert Hawk.  GlobalSecurity.org website. Available at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/desert-hawk.htm, (accessed 22 August 2006).   
92 
 programs should be considered in out-year budgeting forecasts, as well as  ‘train 
 the trainer’ programs to allow for in-house development and proper 
 continuity.  Similarly, those procuring these new systems and equipment should 
 plan/budget for necessary future upgrades.  Often equipment or operating 
 systems become obsolete after the initial contract expires, leaving the 
 system/equipment owner with the responsibility of funding  necessary upgrades.   
2. Ensure the systems or equipment acquired is capable of integrating 
 with existing infrastructure or at the very least not have negative cascading effects 
 upon one another when being utilized.  In the past, newly acquired items have 
 negated or partially degraded an existing item/system’s capabilities. 
3. Ideally, portable gear carried by security personnel should be easily 
 managed (in regards to storage and inventory), receive scheduled periodic 
 maintenance by those trained to perform it and most importantly, function 
 properly when called upon to do so.  If gear is easily pilfered or lost and does not 
 receive the appropriate cleaning and/or maintenance required to function, it will 
 not. 
4. Users of this equipment or these systems must learn to not become  solely 
 reliant upon the technology and relax on previously developed tactics, techniques 
 and procedures.  While many of these ‘gadgets’ may in fact improve upon or 
 increase overall awareness, systems and equipment  fail and can often produce 
 false positives or incomplete/inadvertent data.  Inspector General (IG) and  self-
 inspection checklists should account for procedures during system failures 
 and these common tasks should be exercised regularly.   
5. Similarly, advancements in various technologies can and often do 
 provide force enhancement, yet they do not always offer force replacement 
 opportunities.  While infrared and thermal imaging devices  may free up Security 
 Forces personnel from several of their static or non-mobile posts, they still require 
 a Security Forces member to monitor them and dispatch a response unit in the 
 case of an alarm or intrusion.  Technology can therefore assist in the force 
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 protection mission, but Security Forces members (and other uniformed personnel) 
 are still required to accomplish the mission. 
6. Often, the naked eye or older technologies serve as the back-up 
 assessment tool when primary systems go down.  Planners should anticipate 
 system failures and develop redundancies incorporating either replacement 
 technologies or additional manpower/posts as required to fill the existing void.   
7. Security Forces leadership should remind air base leadership to remain 
 flexible as new air base defense technologies come on line.  As pop-up 
 barriers, SmartGate systems, proxy card readers and other systems are 
 incorporated, delays can be expected.  Vehicles and  personnel may be redirected 
 or take additional time when entering various locations, and these delays should 
 be explained and advertised as necessary.   
8. Security Forces leadership or appropriate unit personnel should 
 continue to keep in close contact with the Security Forces Battlelab and other 
 producers of air base defense technology (such as TSWG) for prototype units 
 which are often available to the requestor at little or no expense to the unit.  Often 
 these agencies are seeking a testing environment for their equipment and will 
 place the equipment and monitor it for results and little/no cost to the unit.  
 Planners should not accept any/all equipment, but only that which may be 
 necessary to fill an existing void in air base defense mission execution.   
9. Base defenders in Vietnam were often given gear or equipment 
 upgrades they neither felt were necessary nor desired.  While a few of these 
 “upgrades” were moderately beneficial, most only required  additional training or 
 were simply ill-suited for the Vietnam climate.  It is imperative that 
 Security Forces commanders and acquisition planners take into account the needs 
 and requirements of the security personnel on the ground performing the IBD 
 mission.  The latest and greatest gadget should not be simply thrust upon them 
 because it is new and shiny.  Ease of  integration, overall effectiveness and level 
 of utility factors should all be weighed with overall cost when considering new air 

























If you joined the Air Force not long ago and became a security forces 
person, you would have spent a lot of your time guarding missile silos, 
guarding bombers, alert fighters, guarding gates, or at least being at a 
gate. But after we stood up 50 expeditionary bases in the Arabian Gulf 
and after we’ve had attacks on the bases, after we have had rockets and 
mortar attacks on the bases, after we’ve had aircraft hit on arrival and 
departure with surface-to-air missiles and small-arms fire, and after we’ve 
looked at what does it take to secure an airfield in an expeditionary sense, 
this security force business takes on a whole different light. . . . Get 
outside the wire with the Office of Special Investigations folks . . . and 
begin to think about what’s a threat to this airfield. What do we have to do 
to defend it so we can operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in a true 
joint sense, and in a true combatant sense, so that there are no threats to 
this airfield that we haven’t thought about? 
  General Michael T. Moseley, Chief of Staff of the Air Force202  
 
In the past, the Air Force mistakenly neglected numerous doctrinal and procedural 
deficiencies directly connected to their air base defense mission.  While the Air Force 
painstakingly and often begrudgingly developed its own base defense doctrine, enemy 
forces lurked undetected in the shadows wreaking constant and costly havoc to forward 
deployed air bases.  Between undefined forward and rear areas, uncooperative host nation 
forces and an incorrect/industrial focus on defending only the innermost portions of its air 
bases, the Air Force’s primitive air base defense capabilities suffered early defeats in both 
Korea and Vietnam.  Air Force casualties from Vietnam alone are staggering; 155 
servicemen were killed with over 1,700 others wounded in action.203  Despite the 
casualties and the continued successes of enemy stand-off attacks, the Air Force’s air 
base defense mission remained relatively unchanged after Vietnam and remained so for 
nearly another twenty years.   
                                                 
202 Robert H. Holmes, et al., “The Air Force’s New Ground War: Ensuring Projection of Air and 
Space Power through Expeditionary Security Operations,” Air & Space Power Journal, (Fall 2006), 
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203 Fox, 207. 
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Over the last several decades, security and force protection planners have seen an 
obvious shift in the global security state of affairs.  Replacing the Cold War threats of 
nuclear sabotage and communist air base infiltration are the unconventional enemies 
forming insurgencies and fighting more asymmetric methods of warfare.  The attack on 
Khobar Towers, and more recently the insurgent uprisings in Afghanistan and Iraq, are 
perfect examples of this recent trend.  The Khobar attack brought to the forefront several 
of the force protection policy deficiencies and execution errors that remained unchecked 
and mostly unchanged from the Cold War period and beyond.  
A thorough examination of air base attacks during these earlier periods indicated 
an improper focus on several policy and procedural areas.  Vital programs such as 
intelligence collection and analysis, critical infrastructure protection and implementing 
effective force protection technologies led to far too many successful enemy air base 
attacks in the past, and ultimately the loss of too many precious lives and war fighting 
assets.  As the Integrated Base Defense mission evolves, specific attention must be paid 
to improve upon these critical areas to avoid a repeat of those operational and doctrinal 
mistakes made in the past.   
One of the primary lessons learned from the hundreds of attacks in Vietnam and 
one explosive attack at Khobar was that ground combat operations lacked a functional 
intelligence program to support the force protection mission.  Attempts to utilize 
indigenous sources, create organic SF intelligence positions and/or develop functional 
programs with outside agencies lacked functionality or fell short of mission operability.  
Today, fusion centers, real-time data networks and other information sharing programs 
are essential in executing the IBD mission.  More importantly, the coalition of Air Force 
intelligence, AFOSI and Security Forces, organizations that currently coexist on air bases 
both home and abroad, must develop a cohesive and efficient information sharing system 
to enable commanders on the ground to make sound and often timely force protection 
decisions.  Proper collection, rapid analysis and thorough dissemination of threat 
information are necessary to support the IBD mission.  
All available literature on air base attacks over the past 60 years indicates the vast 
majority of attacks were conducted by insurgent or guerrilla ground forces targeting 
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aircraft or war fighting assets with a desire to impact both the American military’s ability 
to fight as well as the American public’s political will to support the fight.  Today’s 
enemies still know they are no match for U.S. military dominance, and therefore have 
and will continue to choose unconventional methods to attack our operational and 
strategic military infrastructure.  However, the protection of this critical infrastructure is 
often quite challenging for a number of reasons.  First, during threat and/or vulnerability 
assessments, the tools used by working groups and force protection planners to determine 
a particular infrastructure’s vulnerability or subjectivity to risk are often quite subjective.  
Additionally, increasing the security posture for a specific infrastructure through various 
force protection measures often leaves other, only slightly less critical infrastructure, 
more vulnerable.  Finally, with many nodes and/or networks of war fighting 
infrastructure meshed together across various air bases, Major Commands and Combatant 
Commands, an attack upon one portion may have a cascading effect upon the others.  
What is quite clear from the available literature on previous air base attacks is that the 
protection of critical infrastructure was not given proper emphasis.  Force protection 
planners, and ultimately commanders on the ground, need to ensure this infrastructure, 
whether proprietary or networked, is protected at all costs, and that contingency plans 
exist for the implementation of redundant systems when and if the need arises. 
Due to exponential modern advancements in technology today, cameras, radars 
and other high-tech sensors used in the execution of the force protection mission are often 
only as good as the operators who use them.  Yet in the cases presented in this research, 
technologies, when they were available, were often inadequate, inappropriate and mostly 
ineffective against deterring the enemy’s stand-off attacks.  Had many of these 
technologies been properly field tested for the environments for which they were 
planned, upgrades and modifications to these systems may have provided the required 
technological support the ground forces needed.  Despite their tremendous upside, force 
protection technologies are certainly not the sole solution for disrupting or better yet, 
deterring enemy stand-off attacks.  However, they do represent a tremendous upgrade 
from the Security Forces member’s naked eye, a pair of muddy/cracked binoculars or 
some antiquated TASS equipment similar to those available in earlier periods.  Today, 
ground forces utilize enhanced technologies to enlarge their battle space and identify 
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potential enemy targets and their activities before they approach the air base perimeter.  
In order to exploit this strategic advantage, the IBD mission will require continued 
advancements in force protection technologies that detect and assess enemy movement in 
the stand-off zones.  However, detecting enemy movements on radar or a camera monitor 
are only half the battle.  The overall IBD objectives of “see”, “understand” and “act” first 
will also require that Security Forces members put “boots on the ground” outside the air 
base perimeter.   
Base defense forces must proactively seek to not only get inside the enemy’s 
planning cycle through quality intelligence and high-tech sensors, but also actually 
maneuver into his operating areas by launching preemptive patrols and countermeasures.  
Similar to the SAFESIDE missions conducted in Vietnam, the Air Force recently 
instituted Operation DESERT SAFESIDE in Iraq and achieved tremendous results.  After 
over 400 stand-off attacks rocked U.S. air bases in Balad, Security Forces members 
deployed in the region began a 60-day operation seeking to deter future enemy 
aggression and prevent additional stand-off attacks.  Security Forces patrols outside the 
air base perimeter resulted in the eventual capture of 17 high-value targets, over 100 
insurgents and a number of weapons caches.  More importantly, this team was able to 
virtually eliminate enemy stand-off attacks in that area.204  Brief execution of SAFESIDE 
missions in Vietnam, as well as more recent attempts in Iraq, proves Security Forces men 
and women are more than capable of defeating the insurgent stand-off threat.  History has 
demonstrated that as long as our enemies were allowed to operate freely within the stand-
off range of our forward-deployed air bases, they continued to wreak havoc through 
violent and repeated attacks.  The execution of IBD must prevent the enemy such 
proximity at all costs.   
With the expectation of irregular types of threats to continue, coupled with our 
enemy’s increasing desire to conduct calamitous and symbolic violence, air bases, 
regardless of their location, remain a constant target.  Additionally, the seemingly 
expanding Global War on Terror and the Security Force’s associated expeditionary 
ground defense role place these war fighters at air bases increasingly in harms way.  With 
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forward-operating air bases cropping up in remote regions of the world, initial 
fielding/siting and other security considerations remain a growing concern of air base 
defense planners.  With vast expenditures on force protection enhancements and other 
detection equipment following the 9/11 attacks and subsequent budgetary windfall, air 
bases are better prepared to detect and defend against VBIEDs and other penetrating 
attacks now than in days past.  However, as the experts cited in Chapter III predict, future 
attacks on air bases will probably not involve the enemy’s use of conventional methods, 
but rather replicate the attacks seen during Korea and Vietnam through the use of 
mortars, rockets and other stand-off weapons.  In fact, during the first two years of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. air bases in Iraq have been targeted over 1,500 times, 
mostly via mortar and rocket fire attacks.205  The successful and repeated enemy attacks 
on Iraq air bases prompted General Ronald Keys, Air Combat Command Commander, to 
pronounce air base defense one of the top five unsolved critical problems facing the U.S. 
Air Force today.206   
As the DOD and the Air Force continue to evolve technologically, tactically, and 
strategically to match future challenges and missions, so to do the Security Forces.  
Security Forces members defending forward-deployed air bases can expect successful 
enemy attacks to have potentially devastating effects on aircraft, war fighting logistics 
and troop living quarters.  Security operations, including early detection and deterrence of 
the stand-off areas around air bases, remain critical to the success of the overall IBD and 
force protection missions.  Security Forces must also look to expand their battle space 
and control the standoff footprint through the use of improved intelligence, integrated 
sensor systems and other technologies.  Former Security Forces Director, Brigadier 
General Robert Holmes, called this a “refocus on how Security Forces will train and 
fight.”  He goes on to say, “We’re not in the Cold War anymore; we have to alter our 
mentality and practices for today’s reality…we owe it to our Airmen, fighting the global 
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Iraqi Freedom began in March of 2003 (Holmes, et al., “The Air Force’s New Ground War”, 3). 
206 D.T. Young, Security Forces Transformation: Why, What For?  Air Force Print News Today, 27 
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war on terror, to provide training, equipment and resources to be effective.”207  In a 
recent speaking engagement, current Security Forces Director, Brigadier General Mary 
Hertog stated, 
The war on terror has forced us to rethink how we defend our air bases, 
both home station and deployed.  We can no longer stay inside the 
perimeter manning static posts and let the threat come to us and rely on 
another service to take care of that threat.  We must integrate more with 
Joint Forces, with technology…and promote the evolution of force 
protection culture across our Air Force—everyone in the Air Force needs 
to be a warrior and involved in base defense.208 
Air bases continue to face a full-spectrum of terrorist threats, and Security Forces 
cannot anticipate and defend against them alone.  Air base defense, particularly as it 
applies to defending against enemy ground attacks, has traditionally been viewed within 
the USAF as a Security Police problem.  Yet, as long as the execution of the national 
military strategy continues to rely heavily upon airpower’s contributions, every man and 
woman in uniform must maintain a heightened sense of awareness and participate in the 
air base defense mission.209  Through increased training and awareness, everyone must 
develop a basic force protection skill set and assist in the defense of an air base when/if 
attacked.  Specifically, Security Forces members, from the newest airman all the way up 
the chain of command, play a vital role in managing effective intelligence, executing an 
appropriate critical infrastructure plan and utilizing the latest in force protection 
technologies 
As the Security Forces career field strives to become a significant, war fighting 
capability, providing security operations for deployed commanders, the doctrinal and 
operational changes surrounding Integrated Base Defense must evolve quickly and 
efficiently.  History has shown us that earlier attempts to thwart the enemy’s stand-off 
attacks through air base defense were mostly futile.  With the attack methodologies of 
current and future enemies mirroring those of the insurgents ground forces faced and 
mostly failed at stopping before, we can no longer afford doctrinal and procedural errors                                                  
207 J.G. Buzanowski, “Security Forces Transformation:  More Than Meets the Eye,” Air Force Print 
News, 2 January 2006, 1. 
208 Mary J. Hertog, Speech given at the Annual Security Police Association Meeting, Arlington, VA, 
on September 2006.  Taken from Tiger Flight 15, No. 6, November/December 2006, 4-5.    
209 Headquarters, United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4.1, 4. 
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to limit our air base defense capabilities.  Today’s enemies have proven they are capable 
of much, much more, and we need to stand ready to defeat them.  It is clear now, more 
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